Political Science 141
Russian Politics
Dr. Sharyl Cross
Final Take Home Examination
Russian Politics
First Essay on Russian Politics
In 1939, Winston Churchill described Russia as a “riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” Russia is an enigma that few Westerners can fully understand. Her development as a nation-state-has followed neither a full Western concept of society and culture, nor has she reverted to an Eastern concept of society. In reality, Russia has created a hybrid society taking elements of both cultures. Please explain?
The most important aspect of this hybridization is the conflict of a western notion of individual thought verses the eastern notion of community thought. This affects every aspect of Russian society. Western views of individualism and scientific rationalism were imported into Russia by the Tsars, Russian nobles and intellectual elites. Peter I, and Catherine II both attempted to bring in Western intellectual thought, art and culture. And yet this attempt at westernizing Russia conflicts with the traditional Russian values of community, family and its deep religious beliefs found in the Russian Orthodox Church. In other words, Western individual thought contradicts with the traditional Russian feelings of communitarism. Another example is the view that Western society believes in the separation of church and state. This contradicts the deep Russian beliefs in religion and its integral part of Russian politics. What is interesting to note is that Russia attempted to create a hybrid ideology incorporating these two conflicting ideals through the Communist Party. The Communist Party was a rationally scientific attempt at creating a new “Soviet Man,” living in a Utopian society using elements of both Western and Eastern thought. An example of such is the Communist ideology which individuals had the right and obligation to work for the common good of society. Yet individuals who were able to work their way up through the ranks of the communist hierarchy could be rewarded for their efforts inside the Party system—those outside the party system had no means of social or economic movement. Communism also sought to incorporate a religious doctrine into their ideology. While Communism preached for the separation of church and state through promoting atheism, or cracking down on the Eastern Orthodox religion, the Communist Party also created it own religion with Marxist-Leninism as its religious ideology. This became even more pronounced as the Party elevated both Lenin and Stalin into mythical deities with their phrases and beliefs changed to a quasi-religious scripture. Finally, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia is currently being torn between the notion of the West’s free market approach of capitalism and the Communist ideology of state-market economic planning with its roots in communitarism. Russia has adapted by creating a number of Russian oligarchies, which control the Russian means of industrial production. These oligarchies have connections within the Russian Mafia and the government of which it can exert its influences with impunity. More importantly, is the shift in these oligarchies views of enriching themselves and their own interests with a distinctly Western view of individualism over that of the traditional Russian view of communitarianism. This can be seen through the collapse of the Russian welfare system with the harsh living conditions that have been thrust upon ordinary Russian’s daily life. There is also an economic class distinction where a select few Russians in the government, the bureaucracy, and the Mafia who have gathered up the wealth of Russia, while the majority of Russian citizens struggle to survive in such harsh conditions each day.
Another aspect of Russia is the Russian individuals dual personality. On the outside, Russians could be seen as somewhat impassive and suspicious. Russians would not openly state their opinions or views on an issue or the government for a fear of reprisals against them. This was an outer personality. And yet, there was an inner personality where they could be warm, caring and fiercely loyal and proud to those they could trust. This dual personality has its roots in the old Tsaris period when Russians had to fear the state secret police. With no freedom of speech or expression, Russians had to be careful with who they could share their personal views and opinions. This personality was more pronounced during the Communist regime. The West had no counterpart to this dual personality since the Western peoples and societies had the rights of freedom of speech and expression. In Russia, government criticism to the wrong people could cause the individual to be arrested by the state secret police simply for speaking his opinion during the Tsaris and Soviet periods. Therefore, the Russians were always guarded as to what they could say to whom. Currently with the Yeltsin government, the Russian people have full rights of freedom of speech, worship, and assembly, which was unheard of 70 years ago. However certain rights such as the freedom of press my be restricted not through government censorship, but rather through economics as newspaper, radio and television stations are purchased through oligarchs and Russian Mafia fronts which use those media outlets to restrict the editorial content of the press or they will force the press to publish to their own favorable views on issues.
For much of its history, Russia has felt this pulling of traditions between Eastern and Western thought and culture. Russia has straddled between these extremes. The Communist experiment was Russia’s unique attempt to incorporate these opposing views into a new and distinct Russian culture. This culture could only originate in Russia.
Second Essay on Russian Politics
The fall of the Romanov dynasty brought an end to the house of the Tsars while beginning a new history of the Soviet state. The Soviet Union was to replace an autocratic monarchy with a worker’s paradise guided by the hand of Joseph Stalin. Did the Soviet Union under Stalin resemble the Russian state under the Tsars?
While the Communist doctrine may reject such similarities between the two dynasties, The Russian government and its social structure remained the same. The most obvious similarity was the nature of the government. Bother the Tsar and the Soviet government were autocratic dictatorships with a strong, central leader. Both Nicholas I and Stalin ruled Russia with a strong-willed dictatorship. Their word was law. There were no other governmental systems to provide a check on their powers. This strong, central leadership has continued to play a part in Russian politics with Yeltsin having established a presidency with tremendous powers. In addition, both Stalin and his Tsar predecessors had an extreme mistrust of dissent and opposition. Catherine II was forced to put down a rebellion uniting Cossacks, Tartars, and serfs under Emelian Pugachev using force in 1773-1774. Stalin was fearful of the Old Bolsheviks who could usurp his power with their knowledge and their close personal relationship with Lenin during the early stages of the revolution when Stalin was consolidating his power. Stalin initiated purges of these Old Bolsheviks, which grew into a self-destructive orgy of killing by Stalin’s minions. One opponent of Stalin’s policies—Leon Trotsky--was assassinated presumably under Stalin’s orders while he was in exile in Mexico. Yeltsin unleashed the army to storm the Russian “White House” to arrest opponents in the legislature who opposed his power in 1993.
A second similarity between the Tsaris and Stalinist Russia was a deep-seated fear of invasion. This can be explained by the Russian geography. Russia is a nation located on a great steppe or plain. There are no natural mountain ranges or swift rivers that can provide a defensive line. Hence, the Russian nation has always been subjected to invasions. Pre-Tsarist Russia was subjected to Mongolian invasions until Ivan the Great overthrew the Mongols and consolidated the Muscovite Russia. Russia was also invaded by Sweden and Poland during the “Time of Troubles,” and the French invaded Russia under Napoleon. Finally, Germany invaded Russia twice—once during the First World War, which caused the Romanov dynasty to end, and during the Second World War that pitted Stalin and Hitler in a fight. Because of these continuous invasions, Russia has always had a deep-seated fear of security and the need for a strong army. Stalin’s Russia was no different. Stalin feared the rise of Nazi Germany and Hitler, which was one of the primary reasons for the non-aggression pact with Germany in 1939. Stalin had hoped the non-aggression pact would allow Russia to buy some time and develop her industry and build up his army before the Germans invaded. Near the end of the Second World War, Stalin was determined not to have a 3rd German invasion on his territory. This prompted Stalin to create the friendly communist regimes in East Europe as a buffer zone to protect against a German and US invasion of Russia. Currently, Russia’s main fear has been the US expansion of NATO into Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as well as the NATO bombings of Kosovo during the Yugoslav crisis. However, with the collapse of the Russian army, there has been little that Russia can do to relieve its own fear and insecurities.
While there were some similarities between the Tsaris and Stalinist regimes, there was one unique difference between them. This unique difference would be seen as a difference between Eastern and Western philosophy. The Tsarist regimes all had a common desire to import Western ideals, thought, culture and art to Russia. Peter the Great traveled through Europe and attempted to build up the Russian army on a European model. Catherine the Great was a former German princess. The Tsars and the Russian intellectual elite’s were cultured and schooled in Western thought and traditions. The peasantry, however, were uneducated to the Western thought. They were brought up with the old Russian traditions, the strong Russian Orthodox religion, and communitarianism. In contrast, Stalin did not have much exposure to Western intellectual and political thought. He came up through the Bolshevik system through hard work and careful Machiavellic planning. Stalin was fearful of the West and its power. He was also fearful of the intellectual elite’s, and of the old Bolsheviks since they could challenge his power through Lenin’s ideals. He eliminated the Old Bolsheviks during the purges of the 1930s. The main reason for this was that the Old Bolsheviks were a part of the original Communist party and had strong memories of Lenin as a man and had memories of Lenin’s views and opinions. They were an intellectual threat to Stalin’s power and his own grandiose dreams of deity for which he encouraged through the cult of Stalinism. More importantly, while the elite’s in the Tsarist period wanted to transform Russia into a strong, decidedly Western power, Stalin transforms the Soviet Union into a militarily strong power for which he immortalized himself as a deity responsible in transforming the Soviet Union. This was the cult of Stalinism.
While Russia has emerged from its Communist past, the similarities and differences between the Stalinist and Tsarist past are a part of Russia’s national character. Russia cannot escape from the past. Russia cannot escape from the Tsars or Stalin. She must learn the lessons they teach to help her move forward in the world and in history.
Showing posts with label SJSU Political Essays. Show all posts
Showing posts with label SJSU Political Essays. Show all posts
Wednesday, May 25, 2005
Machiavelli and Hobbes
Political Science 160B
Modern Political Thought
4-09-01
Midterm Examination: Machiavelli and Hobbes
Machiavelli and Hobbes base their political theories on conceptions of human nature. Compare and contrast these, explaining fully your evaluation.
Human nature. For centuries, man has sought to explain the basic cause of this complex philosophy which can manifest itself in the building of magnificent civilizations extolling the virtues on mankind’s great achievements, and in causing the violent destruction, death and ruin of those great civilizations, mankind’s great achievements scattered among the rubble. According to the ancient philosophers of Plato and Aristotle, human nature could be explained through man’s capacity of reasoning. This idea was accepted and refined by the political and religious thinkers throughout history until the European Renaissance. But Niccolo Machiavelli’s The Prince, and Thomas Hobbes’ The Leviathan brought a new twist towards the conception of human nature. Both thinkers rejected the idea that human nature could be explained by his capacity to reason. Machiavelli believed that human nature was based on man’s own self-interests—determined by virtue and fortune—and political institutions and theories had to reflect this self-interest among all individuals. Whereas Hobbes argued that human nature was based on a state of war between solitary individuals who pursued their own stimulation and passions while fearing violent death. Political institutions and theories by both philosophers were basically a compact between all individuals to moderate their behavior so they may pursue their passions and self-interests.
In order to understand human nature and how human nature affects political theories, Niccolo Machiavelli provided a unique explanation in his short work The Prince. The Prince is a treatise of leadership capabilities of how individuals can gain and control power. Machiavelli states there are two qualities, which affects all individuals and rulers. These two qualities are virtue and fortune. Virtue is a masculine quality. It is the quality of boldness, decisiveness, and action. Machiavelli claims that men with virtue are “innovators” who “depend upon their own resources and can use force,” (Machiavelli, pg. 27). Such men rarely fail. The second quality, which affects all individuals, is fortune. Fortune is the quality that cannot be controlled. Fortune is the unanticipated. It is the luck of the draw. Fortune dominates 50% of life with virtue dominating the other 50%. Machiavelli says, “individuals depend entirely upon the will and fortune—two fickle and unstable things,” (Machiavelli, pg. 28). Fortune can affect individuals in both positive and negative ways. Machiavelli cites Cesare Borgia as an example where Borgia “acquired power through his father’s (Pope Alexander VI) fortunes and lost it through the same means, despite the fact that he exerted every effort and did everything that a prudent and capable man should do to entrench himself in those territories which the arms and fortunes of others had granted him,” (Machiavelli, pg. 29). While fortune and virtue each control a half of an individual and a ruler, the quality of virtue must be held in check by prudence. Prudence is the capacity to understand where actions and trends can lead a person. A ruler must anticipate the consequences of bold and reckless actions found in virtue. “He must be sufficiently prudent to avoid a reputation for those vices which would deprive him of his state and, if possible, also avoid those that would not deprive him of it,” (Machiavelli, pg. 57).
While Machiavelli shows these qualities of virtue, fortune and prudence to be found in princes of states, these qualities can be found in every individual—from the common man to the stately prince. These qualities control an individual’s life—not the capacity of reason as found in the ancient philosophers. This idea provides a unique concept of political theory where an individual is not fully in control of his existence. The qualities of virtue and fortune are used by individuals and rulers alike to pursue their own self-interests. Machiavelli introduces the idea where there was no state. There was no political entity. And if there was no state, then government was not natural among man. “The various kinds of government came into existence among men by chance, for in the beginning of the world, the inhabitants being few, they lived dispersed for a time in the manner of beasts,” (Machiavelli, pg. 92). In this beginning of time, Machiavelli proposes that man lived in anarchy like beasts. But this state of anarchy would not allow individuals to pursue their self-interests. People would feel weak and helpless in this state of anarchy. “Then, as the population increased, they drew together and, the better to defend themselves, they sought out the strongest and bravest one among them, (Machiavelli, pg. 92). This is the start of the political association. Within this state of anarchy where men lived in the manner of beasts, there would be intense competition for each individual to pursue their self-interest. However, this competition benefits only those individuals with a strong quality of virtue, over those who are weaker. Therefore, an early form of social contract was created where a strong powerful individual was chosen and made leader. This strong individual leader would protect the weaker individuals who would accept the leader’s decisions so that all may pursue their self-interests. “From this beginning,” Machiavelli claims, “Came a recognition of what is proper and good, as opposed to what is pernicious and wicked.” Politics comes before everything else. Without some form of political association, there can be no language, culture, laws, justice, morality, religion, ethics and family. This political structure was designed as a second-best alternative. All people through their virtue and fortune pursue their own self-interests. However since people feel they are helpless and weak, they feel it is in their best interest to pledge their support to the strongest and bravest individual who can protect them and allow them to pursue their self-interest. Machiavelli claims that a prince must “encourage his citizens peaceably to pursue their affairs, whether in trade, in agriculture, or in any other human activity, so that no one will hesitate to improve his possessions for fear that they will be taken from him,” (Machiavelli, pg. 79).
While Machiavelli views human nature in regards to man’s pursuit of his self-interests as determined by virtue and fortune, Thomas Hobbes examines a different approach to human nature. Hobbes argues that human nature can be explained through scientific reasoning and empiricism. He intends to place “science” in the middle of political science. For Hobbes, science is “the knowledge of consequences, and dependence of one fact upon another.” (Hobbes, pg. 45). The Leviathan is Hobbes’ attempt to scientifically explain politics and human nature.
Hobbes begins his scientific reasoning with a premise that the state is an artificial human being. He says, “For by art is created that great Leviathan called a Commonwealth, or a State, in Latin Civitas, which is but an artificial man; though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defense it was intended…” (Hobbes, pg. 19). The state is created by humans, but it is not a natural entity. According to Hobbes, each aspect of the state is compared to the organs of man. Hobbes is comparing the idea of the state with the idea of a man. He claims that in order for man to understand each other, they must “learn truly to read one another, if they would take the pains; that is, nosce teipsum, read thyself…to teach us…. That for the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man, to the thoughts and passions of another.” (Hobbes, pg. 20). For Hobbes, empirical observations are the key. Hobbes wants to observe what man is and then compare these observations of man with that of the artificial man or state. Hobbes’ key interest is to strip mankind of all cultural, social, and religious customs. He wants to find what the lowest common denominator is among all of humanity—an equality of all humanity. Hobbes claims that human beings are creatures that respond to the senses and stimulation of their environment. Humans are creatures of senses, “the cause of sense, is the external body, or object, which presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in taste and touch; or mediatelly, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; which pressure, by the mediation of the nerves, and other strings and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and heart,” (Hobbes, pg. 21). Things strike human senses. This stimulation of the senses is what drives humans to react to a particular sensation. Hobbes says there are two types of stimulation, which humans react to. The first is appetite. Appetites are things and stimulation’s which individuals want. An example of appetite is hunger, thirst, sexual desires, desires for things. Appetite is basically a thing an individual wants. The second type of stimulation is aversion. Aversions are things and stimulation’s an individual does not want. Hobbes does not place any value towards appetites or aversions aside from the concept that each individual is bombarded with stimulation and sensations for which they will have appetites and aversions towards those sensations.
However these appetites show the two common denominators that exist in all of mankind. The first common denominator, which Hobbes identifies, is that each individual has a desire towards power. Power allows for an individual to obtain the things that individual want in order to satisfy the individual’s appetite. The cause of power is “that the object of man’s desire, is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire,” (Hobbes, pg. 80). Mankind, Hobbes reiterates, “has a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death,” (Hobbes, pg. 80). The constant desire to satisfy man’s passions, appetites, and stimulation will cause man to ceaselessly obtain more power, which can stop only in death. The second common denominator is the fear of violent death. While man has a desire to satisfy his passions, he also has a desire to avoid a violent death. According to Hobbes, it is these two common denominators, which define human nature.
These two denominators also show a unique influence in political theory. Hobbes claims they are the foundation for which a political society can be built. Hobbes begins by showing how man exists in an environment with only these denominators. First, man is by nature equal in everything. While one man may be stronger than another, his strength is counteracted by the others speed, or deterity. Common strengths among individuals are equally factored by common weaknesses. Hobbes says that “if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end, which is principally their own conservation, and sometime their delectation only, endeavor to destroy, or subdue on another,” (Hobbes, pg. 98-99). Hobbes calls this the state of nature. The state of nature is a state of war. The state of nature has no society, no one individual can trust another individual since all are in combat for the things they want and avoid violent death. In the state of nature, an individual is confronted with others who want to take what they want, to compete against each other or kill for the thing. This state of nature conflicts with an individuals desire to satisfy their passions and avoid violent death. In the state of nature, Hobbes says “there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building, no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,” (Hobbes, pg. 100). Both Hobbes and Machiavelli show a primeval state of nature where man existed without a political association. However, Machiavelli does not dwell into the details of this state of nature aside from the common definition of anarchy where men behave as beasts. Hobbes graphically defines this state.
While Hobbes shows the horrors of entering this state of nature, he also shows a way out of the state of nature. It is achieved by determining the laws of nature through man’s capacity to reason. Laws of nature or natural laws are a universal structure in nature. They can be considered as a higher law placed by God, which transcends man-made laws, and all lesser laws must conform to the natural laws. Hobbes lists two laws of nature. The first law of nature is where man is forbidden to take his own life, and to “endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he ma seed, and use, all helps, and advantages of war,” (Hobbes, pg. 103-104). Man must seek peace and follow peace. The second law of nature is “that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace, and defense of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself,” (Hobbes, pg. 104). This second law says that man must give up a portion of his claim of every desire and passion, if other men will also give up their claims to every desire. This second law has references traced back to the Gospel teachings “whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do you to them,” (Hobbes, pg. 104). This is the beginning of a social contract between men to escape from the state of nature. Machiavelli does not include any reference to natural laws in The Prince. For Machiavelli, the political entity comes first when all people gather around and accept the strongest and bravest man to become their leader, then they create society, mores, religion and laws.
Natural laws do not make a contract in creating a state. Hobbes claims that the idea of the natural laws can be used in developing a specific contract between individuals and the role of a sovereign commonwealth. The basic end of a sovereign is to provide security. The commonwealth or state provides a secure environment for all men where they can live with their own preservation and pursue their own passions and appetites without the fear of violent death or being forced back to the state of nature. The state is an entity where all its inhabitants pledge “I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner,” (Hobbes pg. 132). Hobbes defines the commonwealth as “one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defense. The function of the sovereign is to enforce this contract. The sovereign must keep the people at peace and out of the state of nature. It order for the sovereign to achieve this goal of keeping the peace, the sovereign must have power to enforce its laws. Hobbes recognizes this as another covenant individuals relinquish the use of violence and force to the sovereign with the sovereign’s assurance of protection for those individuals. For what is a covenant, “without the sword, (they) are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all,” (Hobbes, 129). This is completely opposite of Machiavelli who makes a vague reference to a compact between weak people and a strong leader. Hobbes spells out the specific details of covenants between the individuals and states.
The ancient philosophers considered the idea of human nature as something within each individual. Human nature was the capacity to reason and reflect upon ideas and philosophical questions. Both Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes rejected this ancient ideal of human nature. By concentrating on how humans react to stimulation and self-interest, Machiavelli and Hobbes presented new ideas in human nature. While they may be gritty and realistic in description, they provide a new reflection of human nature and how such human nature can affect a political life.
Works Cited
Hobbes, Thomas. (1962). The Leviathan. Macmillian Publishing. Collier Macmillian, Canada.
Machiavelli, Niccolo. (1981) The Prince. Bantam Books. New York.
Modern Political Thought
4-09-01
Midterm Examination: Machiavelli and Hobbes
Machiavelli and Hobbes base their political theories on conceptions of human nature. Compare and contrast these, explaining fully your evaluation.
Human nature. For centuries, man has sought to explain the basic cause of this complex philosophy which can manifest itself in the building of magnificent civilizations extolling the virtues on mankind’s great achievements, and in causing the violent destruction, death and ruin of those great civilizations, mankind’s great achievements scattered among the rubble. According to the ancient philosophers of Plato and Aristotle, human nature could be explained through man’s capacity of reasoning. This idea was accepted and refined by the political and religious thinkers throughout history until the European Renaissance. But Niccolo Machiavelli’s The Prince, and Thomas Hobbes’ The Leviathan brought a new twist towards the conception of human nature. Both thinkers rejected the idea that human nature could be explained by his capacity to reason. Machiavelli believed that human nature was based on man’s own self-interests—determined by virtue and fortune—and political institutions and theories had to reflect this self-interest among all individuals. Whereas Hobbes argued that human nature was based on a state of war between solitary individuals who pursued their own stimulation and passions while fearing violent death. Political institutions and theories by both philosophers were basically a compact between all individuals to moderate their behavior so they may pursue their passions and self-interests.
In order to understand human nature and how human nature affects political theories, Niccolo Machiavelli provided a unique explanation in his short work The Prince. The Prince is a treatise of leadership capabilities of how individuals can gain and control power. Machiavelli states there are two qualities, which affects all individuals and rulers. These two qualities are virtue and fortune. Virtue is a masculine quality. It is the quality of boldness, decisiveness, and action. Machiavelli claims that men with virtue are “innovators” who “depend upon their own resources and can use force,” (Machiavelli, pg. 27). Such men rarely fail. The second quality, which affects all individuals, is fortune. Fortune is the quality that cannot be controlled. Fortune is the unanticipated. It is the luck of the draw. Fortune dominates 50% of life with virtue dominating the other 50%. Machiavelli says, “individuals depend entirely upon the will and fortune—two fickle and unstable things,” (Machiavelli, pg. 28). Fortune can affect individuals in both positive and negative ways. Machiavelli cites Cesare Borgia as an example where Borgia “acquired power through his father’s (Pope Alexander VI) fortunes and lost it through the same means, despite the fact that he exerted every effort and did everything that a prudent and capable man should do to entrench himself in those territories which the arms and fortunes of others had granted him,” (Machiavelli, pg. 29). While fortune and virtue each control a half of an individual and a ruler, the quality of virtue must be held in check by prudence. Prudence is the capacity to understand where actions and trends can lead a person. A ruler must anticipate the consequences of bold and reckless actions found in virtue. “He must be sufficiently prudent to avoid a reputation for those vices which would deprive him of his state and, if possible, also avoid those that would not deprive him of it,” (Machiavelli, pg. 57).
While Machiavelli shows these qualities of virtue, fortune and prudence to be found in princes of states, these qualities can be found in every individual—from the common man to the stately prince. These qualities control an individual’s life—not the capacity of reason as found in the ancient philosophers. This idea provides a unique concept of political theory where an individual is not fully in control of his existence. The qualities of virtue and fortune are used by individuals and rulers alike to pursue their own self-interests. Machiavelli introduces the idea where there was no state. There was no political entity. And if there was no state, then government was not natural among man. “The various kinds of government came into existence among men by chance, for in the beginning of the world, the inhabitants being few, they lived dispersed for a time in the manner of beasts,” (Machiavelli, pg. 92). In this beginning of time, Machiavelli proposes that man lived in anarchy like beasts. But this state of anarchy would not allow individuals to pursue their self-interests. People would feel weak and helpless in this state of anarchy. “Then, as the population increased, they drew together and, the better to defend themselves, they sought out the strongest and bravest one among them, (Machiavelli, pg. 92). This is the start of the political association. Within this state of anarchy where men lived in the manner of beasts, there would be intense competition for each individual to pursue their self-interest. However, this competition benefits only those individuals with a strong quality of virtue, over those who are weaker. Therefore, an early form of social contract was created where a strong powerful individual was chosen and made leader. This strong individual leader would protect the weaker individuals who would accept the leader’s decisions so that all may pursue their self-interests. “From this beginning,” Machiavelli claims, “Came a recognition of what is proper and good, as opposed to what is pernicious and wicked.” Politics comes before everything else. Without some form of political association, there can be no language, culture, laws, justice, morality, religion, ethics and family. This political structure was designed as a second-best alternative. All people through their virtue and fortune pursue their own self-interests. However since people feel they are helpless and weak, they feel it is in their best interest to pledge their support to the strongest and bravest individual who can protect them and allow them to pursue their self-interest. Machiavelli claims that a prince must “encourage his citizens peaceably to pursue their affairs, whether in trade, in agriculture, or in any other human activity, so that no one will hesitate to improve his possessions for fear that they will be taken from him,” (Machiavelli, pg. 79).
While Machiavelli views human nature in regards to man’s pursuit of his self-interests as determined by virtue and fortune, Thomas Hobbes examines a different approach to human nature. Hobbes argues that human nature can be explained through scientific reasoning and empiricism. He intends to place “science” in the middle of political science. For Hobbes, science is “the knowledge of consequences, and dependence of one fact upon another.” (Hobbes, pg. 45). The Leviathan is Hobbes’ attempt to scientifically explain politics and human nature.
Hobbes begins his scientific reasoning with a premise that the state is an artificial human being. He says, “For by art is created that great Leviathan called a Commonwealth, or a State, in Latin Civitas, which is but an artificial man; though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defense it was intended…” (Hobbes, pg. 19). The state is created by humans, but it is not a natural entity. According to Hobbes, each aspect of the state is compared to the organs of man. Hobbes is comparing the idea of the state with the idea of a man. He claims that in order for man to understand each other, they must “learn truly to read one another, if they would take the pains; that is, nosce teipsum, read thyself…to teach us…. That for the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man, to the thoughts and passions of another.” (Hobbes, pg. 20). For Hobbes, empirical observations are the key. Hobbes wants to observe what man is and then compare these observations of man with that of the artificial man or state. Hobbes’ key interest is to strip mankind of all cultural, social, and religious customs. He wants to find what the lowest common denominator is among all of humanity—an equality of all humanity. Hobbes claims that human beings are creatures that respond to the senses and stimulation of their environment. Humans are creatures of senses, “the cause of sense, is the external body, or object, which presseth the organ proper to each sense, either immediately, as in taste and touch; or mediatelly, as in seeing, hearing, and smelling; which pressure, by the mediation of the nerves, and other strings and membranes of the body, continued inwards to the brain and heart,” (Hobbes, pg. 21). Things strike human senses. This stimulation of the senses is what drives humans to react to a particular sensation. Hobbes says there are two types of stimulation, which humans react to. The first is appetite. Appetites are things and stimulation’s which individuals want. An example of appetite is hunger, thirst, sexual desires, desires for things. Appetite is basically a thing an individual wants. The second type of stimulation is aversion. Aversions are things and stimulation’s an individual does not want. Hobbes does not place any value towards appetites or aversions aside from the concept that each individual is bombarded with stimulation and sensations for which they will have appetites and aversions towards those sensations.
However these appetites show the two common denominators that exist in all of mankind. The first common denominator, which Hobbes identifies, is that each individual has a desire towards power. Power allows for an individual to obtain the things that individual want in order to satisfy the individual’s appetite. The cause of power is “that the object of man’s desire, is not to enjoy once only, and for one instant of time; but to assure for ever, the way of his future desire,” (Hobbes, pg. 80). Mankind, Hobbes reiterates, “has a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death,” (Hobbes, pg. 80). The constant desire to satisfy man’s passions, appetites, and stimulation will cause man to ceaselessly obtain more power, which can stop only in death. The second common denominator is the fear of violent death. While man has a desire to satisfy his passions, he also has a desire to avoid a violent death. According to Hobbes, it is these two common denominators, which define human nature.
These two denominators also show a unique influence in political theory. Hobbes claims they are the foundation for which a political society can be built. Hobbes begins by showing how man exists in an environment with only these denominators. First, man is by nature equal in everything. While one man may be stronger than another, his strength is counteracted by the others speed, or deterity. Common strengths among individuals are equally factored by common weaknesses. Hobbes says that “if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their end, which is principally their own conservation, and sometime their delectation only, endeavor to destroy, or subdue on another,” (Hobbes, pg. 98-99). Hobbes calls this the state of nature. The state of nature is a state of war. The state of nature has no society, no one individual can trust another individual since all are in combat for the things they want and avoid violent death. In the state of nature, an individual is confronted with others who want to take what they want, to compete against each other or kill for the thing. This state of nature conflicts with an individuals desire to satisfy their passions and avoid violent death. In the state of nature, Hobbes says “there is no place for industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building, no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,” (Hobbes, pg. 100). Both Hobbes and Machiavelli show a primeval state of nature where man existed without a political association. However, Machiavelli does not dwell into the details of this state of nature aside from the common definition of anarchy where men behave as beasts. Hobbes graphically defines this state.
While Hobbes shows the horrors of entering this state of nature, he also shows a way out of the state of nature. It is achieved by determining the laws of nature through man’s capacity to reason. Laws of nature or natural laws are a universal structure in nature. They can be considered as a higher law placed by God, which transcends man-made laws, and all lesser laws must conform to the natural laws. Hobbes lists two laws of nature. The first law of nature is where man is forbidden to take his own life, and to “endeavor peace, as far as he has hope of obtaining it; and when he cannot obtain it, that he ma seed, and use, all helps, and advantages of war,” (Hobbes, pg. 103-104). Man must seek peace and follow peace. The second law of nature is “that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far-forth, as for peace, and defense of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself,” (Hobbes, pg. 104). This second law says that man must give up a portion of his claim of every desire and passion, if other men will also give up their claims to every desire. This second law has references traced back to the Gospel teachings “whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do you to them,” (Hobbes, pg. 104). This is the beginning of a social contract between men to escape from the state of nature. Machiavelli does not include any reference to natural laws in The Prince. For Machiavelli, the political entity comes first when all people gather around and accept the strongest and bravest man to become their leader, then they create society, mores, religion and laws.
Natural laws do not make a contract in creating a state. Hobbes claims that the idea of the natural laws can be used in developing a specific contract between individuals and the role of a sovereign commonwealth. The basic end of a sovereign is to provide security. The commonwealth or state provides a secure environment for all men where they can live with their own preservation and pursue their own passions and appetites without the fear of violent death or being forced back to the state of nature. The state is an entity where all its inhabitants pledge “I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner,” (Hobbes pg. 132). Hobbes defines the commonwealth as “one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defense. The function of the sovereign is to enforce this contract. The sovereign must keep the people at peace and out of the state of nature. It order for the sovereign to achieve this goal of keeping the peace, the sovereign must have power to enforce its laws. Hobbes recognizes this as another covenant individuals relinquish the use of violence and force to the sovereign with the sovereign’s assurance of protection for those individuals. For what is a covenant, “without the sword, (they) are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all,” (Hobbes, 129). This is completely opposite of Machiavelli who makes a vague reference to a compact between weak people and a strong leader. Hobbes spells out the specific details of covenants between the individuals and states.
The ancient philosophers considered the idea of human nature as something within each individual. Human nature was the capacity to reason and reflect upon ideas and philosophical questions. Both Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes rejected this ancient ideal of human nature. By concentrating on how humans react to stimulation and self-interest, Machiavelli and Hobbes presented new ideas in human nature. While they may be gritty and realistic in description, they provide a new reflection of human nature and how such human nature can affect a political life.
Works Cited
Hobbes, Thomas. (1962). The Leviathan. Macmillian Publishing. Collier Macmillian, Canada.
Machiavelli, Niccolo. (1981) The Prince. Bantam Books. New York.
Plato and Aristotle
Political Science 160A
Classical Political Thought
Take Home Final Examination: Plato and Aristotle
The historian Thomas Carlyle made the famous observation that half of humanity seems to be inspired more by Plato in its thinking and the other half seems to be inspired more by Aristotle. With specific reference to politics and political science, in which group would you be inclined to place yourself? Explain why fully.
Thomas Carlyle made the observation that half of humanity seems to be inspired by Plato while the other half seems to be inspired by Aristotle. This break in humanity appears to be a break in the history of ideals of community and communal values in political life. But what Carlyle may not have realized is that both Plato and Aristotle portray opposite extremes in these political ideals. Plato attempts to define these political ideals by creating a Utopian political society whereas Aristotle takes the view of political ideals by observing and comparing political constitutions. More importantly, both philosophers reject the possibility of examining these political ideals from the opposing viewpoint.
In the Republic, Plato takes the view that to discover goodness and justice in the individual, you must search for it in the state or polis. The entire crux of the argument is that to identify and define what goodness and justice is in the polis, one can then search for those same qualities in an individual. The only means to identify what goodness and justice is in the city is to create a perfect representation of a city in order to examine these characteristics. Plato attempts to create a simple, utopian society based on the idea of people living in a communal, tribal environment close to nature. However, Plato fails to consider that people are individuals with their own individual interests, passions, and emotional viewpoints—both good and bad. These individual interests will conflict with one another. When Plato’s main character Socrates defines this natural city, Glaucon rebukes him as being a city of pigs. Because of this, Plato creates the Utopian society, which can incorporate the luxury lovers and show the comparison of the goodness and justice of the city with the goodness and justice of the individual. But the city is so perfect in its existence with the social and cultural norms so radically different from Greek social norms at that time that the city and its political institutions could never be properly established. This is the main problem with the Republic. Plato has created such an extreme view of a utopian society that the society would be impossible to implement as a viable political entity. For example, Socrates claims that such a society could never be created, even as Glaucon repeatedly asks for specifics in how to create such a society.
Not only is Glaucon anxious to create this Utopian society, but the first half of humanity is anxious as well. While Plato may have viewed this as an intellectual theory for which to stimulate the mind of philosophers, the first half of humanity has taken the Republic as an extreme model for creating the Utopian society. As a result, philosophers and thinkers have all attempted to emulate Plato by creating their own versions of a perfect society. In these perfect societies, it is the polis or state, which defines all aspects of how individuals will live their lives and how these individuals will think. In effect, the state decides everything that an individual will do and think. Plato does not go this far in the Republic. He allows the state to establish guidelines for modifying the behavior for philosopher-kings and guardians who are considered the ruling class. However, he has the state completely ignore the laborers, farmers, and common citizens in the Utopian society—the state never attempts to force these individuals how to think or live. Utopian societies that have been attempted by humanity all have shown the state force its own will upon all people and classes of a society in how these people shall live and how they think. History is littered with such attempts at creating a Utopian society with the Communist revolutions in Russia, China and Vietnam, Nazi Germany’s attempt at creating the master race for Hitler’s thousand year Reich, and even Cambodia where the Khmar Rouge literally depopulated Cambodian cities and forced the Cambodian people to live in a simple agrarian society where individuals who showed any initiative or intelligence were shot in the killing fields. There have been literary works attempting to create Utopian societies such as Aldus Huxley’s Brave New World, George Orwell’s 1984, and Animal Farm, and even the Bible has man living in Utopian setting of the Garden of Eden.
Plato also never considers the possibility of creating a practical society, even though he leaves unique insights in political theory, which can be utilized in developing a practical political association. There are actually two unique insights that Plato simply refers to, but never fully examines. The first is when Glaucon proposes an early form of a social contract where individuals agree with one another not to commit any wrongs. The second insight is Thrasymachus’ views of realpolitiks in which the world is a dog-eat-dog world where the strong survive over the weak. Both of these views concentrate on individual actions with individual reasons for their actions. Yet, Plato fails to comprehend this concept of individuality. He concentrates solely on comparing the Utopian polis with the perfect individual that all other unique and interesting possibilities in intellectual and political thought are ignored. Plato concentrates on the ideal—the ideal individual or the ideal polis. He ignores the problem that such an ideal could never be fully identified or implemented. In the end, humanity studies the Republic, recognizes this ideal, and then attempts to recreate the ideal on a practical matter only to end in failure. Plato has created an illusion of a perfect society which half of humanity continues to believe may exist.
While Plato seemed interested in creating the ideal society and polis, Aristotle take takes the opposite approach in his views of politics. Aristotle examines politics by observing and comparing the structure and characteristics of all constitutions in the world which existed and in the ideal constitutions which showed the basic ideas, but were not implemented such as Plato’s Republic.
The important factor of Aristotle’s Politics is that he develops the concept of contemporary politics where you can develop rational tools of observation to compare different constitutions and note the structural similarities and differences in these constitutions. This concept is founded in Aristotle’s own education and training in the natural sciences and medicine. He was specifically trained in observation. His views are considered more scientific where he observes nature and then incorporates natural elements in the polis. Plato never considered the possibility to observe and compare characteristics of different constitutions. However, the problem with Aristotle is that he uses too much observation and incorporates a greater share of natural elements into individuals and in the polis. This creates a form of bias on observation where the conclusions of such observation can be affected by the individual’s own viewpoints, education and philosophy. Aristotle never uses deductive reasoning as a check to filter out individual biases while Plato’s the Republic consistently uses deductive reasoning to advance its arguments. In addition, Aristotle never considers the realm of alternative possibilities. Aristotle thrashes Plato’s views of the perfect Utopian society, claiming such a society would never conform in a natural setting. However, he does not propose an alternative view of such a constitution, which could reflect the characteristics of a natural environment. He never developed any philosophical views of the state, nor does he elaborate on the state’s relationship with nature in a theoretical model—he only identifies what is natural in a state through his observations and comparisons. A prime example of this is that Aristotle never considered the theory that the state is not a natural element but is a human creation. This modern idea is completely alien to Aristotle.
Finally, there is more of a unique problem which the second half of humanity views Aristotle’s Politics. While the second half of humanity has rejected Plato’s view of creating the perfect Utopian society, they have embraced Aristotle’s model of observing and comparing the structures of different constitutions. With the tools Aristotle has given for comparing political systems, this half of humanity has embraced Thrasymachus’ philosophical views of the individual and the role of politics which are found in Plato’s Republic. In a sense, this half of humanity has attempted to prove Thrasymachus’ political position not on the grounds of a utopian society with a Utopian form of a political government as described in the Republic, but rather using Aristotle’s tools of observing and comparing world constitutions and society as a whole.
While Thomas Carlyle claims that half of humanity is inspired by Plato and the other half by Aristotle, such a claim is not a strict division between the two philosophers. Both Plato and Aristotle examined the role of politics through their own sharp biases. Yet, the whole of humanity seems interested in taking a combination of views from both philosophers and incorporating such views into a new form of political theory and political thought.
Classical Political Thought
Take Home Final Examination: Plato and Aristotle
The historian Thomas Carlyle made the famous observation that half of humanity seems to be inspired more by Plato in its thinking and the other half seems to be inspired more by Aristotle. With specific reference to politics and political science, in which group would you be inclined to place yourself? Explain why fully.
Thomas Carlyle made the observation that half of humanity seems to be inspired by Plato while the other half seems to be inspired by Aristotle. This break in humanity appears to be a break in the history of ideals of community and communal values in political life. But what Carlyle may not have realized is that both Plato and Aristotle portray opposite extremes in these political ideals. Plato attempts to define these political ideals by creating a Utopian political society whereas Aristotle takes the view of political ideals by observing and comparing political constitutions. More importantly, both philosophers reject the possibility of examining these political ideals from the opposing viewpoint.
In the Republic, Plato takes the view that to discover goodness and justice in the individual, you must search for it in the state or polis. The entire crux of the argument is that to identify and define what goodness and justice is in the polis, one can then search for those same qualities in an individual. The only means to identify what goodness and justice is in the city is to create a perfect representation of a city in order to examine these characteristics. Plato attempts to create a simple, utopian society based on the idea of people living in a communal, tribal environment close to nature. However, Plato fails to consider that people are individuals with their own individual interests, passions, and emotional viewpoints—both good and bad. These individual interests will conflict with one another. When Plato’s main character Socrates defines this natural city, Glaucon rebukes him as being a city of pigs. Because of this, Plato creates the Utopian society, which can incorporate the luxury lovers and show the comparison of the goodness and justice of the city with the goodness and justice of the individual. But the city is so perfect in its existence with the social and cultural norms so radically different from Greek social norms at that time that the city and its political institutions could never be properly established. This is the main problem with the Republic. Plato has created such an extreme view of a utopian society that the society would be impossible to implement as a viable political entity. For example, Socrates claims that such a society could never be created, even as Glaucon repeatedly asks for specifics in how to create such a society.
Not only is Glaucon anxious to create this Utopian society, but the first half of humanity is anxious as well. While Plato may have viewed this as an intellectual theory for which to stimulate the mind of philosophers, the first half of humanity has taken the Republic as an extreme model for creating the Utopian society. As a result, philosophers and thinkers have all attempted to emulate Plato by creating their own versions of a perfect society. In these perfect societies, it is the polis or state, which defines all aspects of how individuals will live their lives and how these individuals will think. In effect, the state decides everything that an individual will do and think. Plato does not go this far in the Republic. He allows the state to establish guidelines for modifying the behavior for philosopher-kings and guardians who are considered the ruling class. However, he has the state completely ignore the laborers, farmers, and common citizens in the Utopian society—the state never attempts to force these individuals how to think or live. Utopian societies that have been attempted by humanity all have shown the state force its own will upon all people and classes of a society in how these people shall live and how they think. History is littered with such attempts at creating a Utopian society with the Communist revolutions in Russia, China and Vietnam, Nazi Germany’s attempt at creating the master race for Hitler’s thousand year Reich, and even Cambodia where the Khmar Rouge literally depopulated Cambodian cities and forced the Cambodian people to live in a simple agrarian society where individuals who showed any initiative or intelligence were shot in the killing fields. There have been literary works attempting to create Utopian societies such as Aldus Huxley’s Brave New World, George Orwell’s 1984, and Animal Farm, and even the Bible has man living in Utopian setting of the Garden of Eden.
Plato also never considers the possibility of creating a practical society, even though he leaves unique insights in political theory, which can be utilized in developing a practical political association. There are actually two unique insights that Plato simply refers to, but never fully examines. The first is when Glaucon proposes an early form of a social contract where individuals agree with one another not to commit any wrongs. The second insight is Thrasymachus’ views of realpolitiks in which the world is a dog-eat-dog world where the strong survive over the weak. Both of these views concentrate on individual actions with individual reasons for their actions. Yet, Plato fails to comprehend this concept of individuality. He concentrates solely on comparing the Utopian polis with the perfect individual that all other unique and interesting possibilities in intellectual and political thought are ignored. Plato concentrates on the ideal—the ideal individual or the ideal polis. He ignores the problem that such an ideal could never be fully identified or implemented. In the end, humanity studies the Republic, recognizes this ideal, and then attempts to recreate the ideal on a practical matter only to end in failure. Plato has created an illusion of a perfect society which half of humanity continues to believe may exist.
While Plato seemed interested in creating the ideal society and polis, Aristotle take takes the opposite approach in his views of politics. Aristotle examines politics by observing and comparing the structure and characteristics of all constitutions in the world which existed and in the ideal constitutions which showed the basic ideas, but were not implemented such as Plato’s Republic.
The important factor of Aristotle’s Politics is that he develops the concept of contemporary politics where you can develop rational tools of observation to compare different constitutions and note the structural similarities and differences in these constitutions. This concept is founded in Aristotle’s own education and training in the natural sciences and medicine. He was specifically trained in observation. His views are considered more scientific where he observes nature and then incorporates natural elements in the polis. Plato never considered the possibility to observe and compare characteristics of different constitutions. However, the problem with Aristotle is that he uses too much observation and incorporates a greater share of natural elements into individuals and in the polis. This creates a form of bias on observation where the conclusions of such observation can be affected by the individual’s own viewpoints, education and philosophy. Aristotle never uses deductive reasoning as a check to filter out individual biases while Plato’s the Republic consistently uses deductive reasoning to advance its arguments. In addition, Aristotle never considers the realm of alternative possibilities. Aristotle thrashes Plato’s views of the perfect Utopian society, claiming such a society would never conform in a natural setting. However, he does not propose an alternative view of such a constitution, which could reflect the characteristics of a natural environment. He never developed any philosophical views of the state, nor does he elaborate on the state’s relationship with nature in a theoretical model—he only identifies what is natural in a state through his observations and comparisons. A prime example of this is that Aristotle never considered the theory that the state is not a natural element but is a human creation. This modern idea is completely alien to Aristotle.
Finally, there is more of a unique problem which the second half of humanity views Aristotle’s Politics. While the second half of humanity has rejected Plato’s view of creating the perfect Utopian society, they have embraced Aristotle’s model of observing and comparing the structures of different constitutions. With the tools Aristotle has given for comparing political systems, this half of humanity has embraced Thrasymachus’ philosophical views of the individual and the role of politics which are found in Plato’s Republic. In a sense, this half of humanity has attempted to prove Thrasymachus’ political position not on the grounds of a utopian society with a Utopian form of a political government as described in the Republic, but rather using Aristotle’s tools of observing and comparing world constitutions and society as a whole.
While Thomas Carlyle claims that half of humanity is inspired by Plato and the other half by Aristotle, such a claim is not a strict division between the two philosophers. Both Plato and Aristotle examined the role of politics through their own sharp biases. Yet, the whole of humanity seems interested in taking a combination of views from both philosophers and incorporating such views into a new form of political theory and political thought.
John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government
Political Science 160B
Modern Political Thought
5-18-01
Take Home Final Exam: John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government
Select one of the following and explain in an essay of 4-5 pages to what extent and why you agree or disagree with Locke’s or Rousseau’s reasoning and conclusions. Cite relevant passages from the text.
In The Second Treatise of Government, John Locke makes the basic argument that private property is a natural right for all people and that private property must exist among people before a social compact for the creation of government can be made. Locke has a great interest in private property. He endeavors to show “how men might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common. (Locke. Pg. 18).” God gave the earth to humans. It becomes man’s responsibility to use his labor in order to work the land for producing things. Locke clearly states this in that whatever man “removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property, (Locke. Pg. 19).” Locke does not say that God has created private property, but rather he has placed the natural resources upon the earth for man to use. It is up to man to use his labor in order to improve upon nature and create greater resources, which would improve upon his life. The key is property. Locke attempts to explain a social contract for both society and for the development of a government by defining a pre-capitalistic trade and market economy with the use of scientific reasoning. He cites two examples in his line of reasoning. The first is the Law of Nature. Locke claims that if you use nature to take something from nature, that that thing is property and it belongs to you. However, if you grab something from someone else, who used labor to acquire something from nature, that thing does not belong to you and you have broken a law of nature. Locke says that in the Law of Nature, “no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions, (Locke. Pg. 9).” A second example of this reasoning is the concept of spoilage. Spoilage is considered a deterrent against individual hoarding of goods. “As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labor fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy, (Locke. Pg. 20-21).” Here Locke may realize that there is a need for individuals to provide charity to those in need. However, the idea of charity contradicts the idea of man using labor to acquire property. Individuals who use labor to make things and acquire property will be motivated by self-interest. They would be interested in making products that they can trade for other products, which they do not make. Charity is the idea that you give to help others in need, for the betterment of society. Self-interest does not play a part in charity. So Locke redefines the meaning of the word charity as the natural event of spoilage in order to prevent individuals from hoarding and allow those individuals to provide their products to all of man.
What Locke created in The Second Treatise of Government, was an early form of capitalistic thought. People have a greater need than simply living, in a natural setting while hunting and gathering for food. People use property as a means to enjoy life and enjoy the fruits of their labor. What they produce in excess, they can trade or sell the excess to others in exchange for other unique products, satisfying their self-interests. “The same law of nature, that does this means give us property, does also bound that property to. God has given us all the things richly, (Locke. Pg. 20).” Locke even goes through a condensed history of how man developed the idea of property y, development of agriculture, the idea of trade where agricultural products such as foodstuffs can be traded for finished products, even the invention of money which Locke describes as “a little piece of yellow metal, which would keep without wasting or decay, (Locke. Pg. 23).” But Locke does not expand these ideas as a new type of economic thought. He attempts to politicize the idea of property. Government was created by the people as a means of resolving disputes of property. “The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of their property, (Locke. Pg. 111).”
One of the main problems with The Second Treatise of Government is that Locke places too much emphasis on the concept of private property rights and in linking these property rights with the origins and development of government. Chapter 5 of the Second Treatise could be considered a pre-history of capitalism. But even with this emphasis of property, Locke does not recognize two problems with his arguments. First, he does not see that an unequal distribution of property will cause a division of class based on economics. There is only a limited amount of land in the world and only a smaller amount of land would have the right conditions to allow agricultural development. Not everyone will have the ability or chance to own land. Yet at the same time, there will be individuals who by luck or fortune will have the ability to acquire large tracts of land. The more land these individuals can acquire, the greater the share of wealth they will have over those who do not have land. This will cause a division of class between those who have land and those who have not. This unequal distribution of wealth and economic classes can also cause an unequal distribution of political rights. This unequal distribution of political rights would allow those who have a greater share of property, to use their property and wealth as a means to adjust political, social and economic policy to their advantage and to satisfy their interests over the interests of those who do not have land. Locke accepts the majority principle of government “where men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest, (Locke Pg. 52).” Locke does not grasp this contradiction.
The second contradiction that Locke does not realize is his equation of happiness with property. Locke equates happiness with the acquisition of property. He notes that property is a natural right that God has provided a natural abundance of resources for man to use and enjoy. Locke also claims that this is a part of human nature to better ones own self and to satisfy their individual self-interest. For Locke, this self-interest is the improvement of material positions and material well being in an individual—how much property can the individual acquire in his lifetime? With the acquisition of property, an individual can enjoy free leisure time of which the individuals can devote themselves to this leisure time to explore their self-interests in culture, music, the arts, language and history. While Locke focuses on property and the foundation of civilization, and uses reason to further advance his arguments, he does not consider the emotional side of happiness. He does not ask if there is another side of happiness, which could be based on emotional self-fulfillment, and that this side of happiness may have no basis for material possessions. Locke does not question these philosophical ideas of emotional self-fulfillment as asked by other philosophers such as Rousseau.
Works Cited
Locke, John. (1980). The Second Treatise of Government. Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis.
Modern Political Thought
5-18-01
Take Home Final Exam: John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government
Select one of the following and explain in an essay of 4-5 pages to what extent and why you agree or disagree with Locke’s or Rousseau’s reasoning and conclusions. Cite relevant passages from the text.
In The Second Treatise of Government, John Locke makes the basic argument that private property is a natural right for all people and that private property must exist among people before a social compact for the creation of government can be made. Locke has a great interest in private property. He endeavors to show “how men might come to have a property in several parts of that which God gave to mankind in common. (Locke. Pg. 18).” God gave the earth to humans. It becomes man’s responsibility to use his labor in order to work the land for producing things. Locke clearly states this in that whatever man “removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property, (Locke. Pg. 19).” Locke does not say that God has created private property, but rather he has placed the natural resources upon the earth for man to use. It is up to man to use his labor in order to improve upon nature and create greater resources, which would improve upon his life. The key is property. Locke attempts to explain a social contract for both society and for the development of a government by defining a pre-capitalistic trade and market economy with the use of scientific reasoning. He cites two examples in his line of reasoning. The first is the Law of Nature. Locke claims that if you use nature to take something from nature, that that thing is property and it belongs to you. However, if you grab something from someone else, who used labor to acquire something from nature, that thing does not belong to you and you have broken a law of nature. Locke says that in the Law of Nature, “no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions, (Locke. Pg. 9).” A second example of this reasoning is the concept of spoilage. Spoilage is considered a deterrent against individual hoarding of goods. “As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labor fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy, (Locke. Pg. 20-21).” Here Locke may realize that there is a need for individuals to provide charity to those in need. However, the idea of charity contradicts the idea of man using labor to acquire property. Individuals who use labor to make things and acquire property will be motivated by self-interest. They would be interested in making products that they can trade for other products, which they do not make. Charity is the idea that you give to help others in need, for the betterment of society. Self-interest does not play a part in charity. So Locke redefines the meaning of the word charity as the natural event of spoilage in order to prevent individuals from hoarding and allow those individuals to provide their products to all of man.
What Locke created in The Second Treatise of Government, was an early form of capitalistic thought. People have a greater need than simply living, in a natural setting while hunting and gathering for food. People use property as a means to enjoy life and enjoy the fruits of their labor. What they produce in excess, they can trade or sell the excess to others in exchange for other unique products, satisfying their self-interests. “The same law of nature, that does this means give us property, does also bound that property to. God has given us all the things richly, (Locke. Pg. 20).” Locke even goes through a condensed history of how man developed the idea of property y, development of agriculture, the idea of trade where agricultural products such as foodstuffs can be traded for finished products, even the invention of money which Locke describes as “a little piece of yellow metal, which would keep without wasting or decay, (Locke. Pg. 23).” But Locke does not expand these ideas as a new type of economic thought. He attempts to politicize the idea of property. Government was created by the people as a means of resolving disputes of property. “The reason why men enter into society, is the preservation of their property, (Locke. Pg. 111).”
One of the main problems with The Second Treatise of Government is that Locke places too much emphasis on the concept of private property rights and in linking these property rights with the origins and development of government. Chapter 5 of the Second Treatise could be considered a pre-history of capitalism. But even with this emphasis of property, Locke does not recognize two problems with his arguments. First, he does not see that an unequal distribution of property will cause a division of class based on economics. There is only a limited amount of land in the world and only a smaller amount of land would have the right conditions to allow agricultural development. Not everyone will have the ability or chance to own land. Yet at the same time, there will be individuals who by luck or fortune will have the ability to acquire large tracts of land. The more land these individuals can acquire, the greater the share of wealth they will have over those who do not have land. This will cause a division of class between those who have land and those who have not. This unequal distribution of wealth and economic classes can also cause an unequal distribution of political rights. This unequal distribution of political rights would allow those who have a greater share of property, to use their property and wealth as a means to adjust political, social and economic policy to their advantage and to satisfy their interests over the interests of those who do not have land. Locke accepts the majority principle of government “where men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest, (Locke Pg. 52).” Locke does not grasp this contradiction.
The second contradiction that Locke does not realize is his equation of happiness with property. Locke equates happiness with the acquisition of property. He notes that property is a natural right that God has provided a natural abundance of resources for man to use and enjoy. Locke also claims that this is a part of human nature to better ones own self and to satisfy their individual self-interest. For Locke, this self-interest is the improvement of material positions and material well being in an individual—how much property can the individual acquire in his lifetime? With the acquisition of property, an individual can enjoy free leisure time of which the individuals can devote themselves to this leisure time to explore their self-interests in culture, music, the arts, language and history. While Locke focuses on property and the foundation of civilization, and uses reason to further advance his arguments, he does not consider the emotional side of happiness. He does not ask if there is another side of happiness, which could be based on emotional self-fulfillment, and that this side of happiness may have no basis for material possessions. Locke does not question these philosophical ideas of emotional self-fulfillment as asked by other philosophers such as Rousseau.
Works Cited
Locke, John. (1980). The Second Treatise of Government. Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis.
German Immigration and Democratization
PolS 148
Democratization
German Immigration and Democratization
A fundamental question is being debated within Germany’s political and cultural society. This question is, ‘Who is German?’ What individual constitutes a German citizen? A stereotypical view of the German citizen could be a blond-haired, blue eyed burly individual who would be good-natured, drink beer, speak with an accent slurring the ‘s’ to a ‘z,’ be militarily precise and hard working, and would dress in Bavarian clothes. Yet foreign immigrants who are incorporating their own customs and mores into German culture and German society are now challenging the view of what constitutes a German citizen. With these clashing views on identity, German immigration has evolved into a split personality. One aspect of the German immigration is to allow foreigners and refugees seeking asylum into the country. And yet at the same time, immigration and naturalization laws make it almost impossible for immigrants to become naturalized German citizens. It is this fractured personality of German laws that have caused immigrants to become the equivalent of second-class citizens. Such a fracture may cause racial conflict within German society.
Immigration into modern Germany started in the 1950s when West Germany began to integrate her economy into the European Common Market. This was the start of the West German Wirtchaftswunder or Economic Miracle. At the end of the Second World War, West Germany’s economy was in the midst of a labor shortage. To combat this labor shortage, West Germany invited thousands of “Gastarbeiter,” or “guest workers” from Mediterranean and Southern European countries to temporarily fill positions in its industrial workforce. These guest workers would help Germany grow in her industry before returning to their original countries. Within the ages of twenty to forty, the Gastarbeiters brought their families over to Germany, rather than sending money back to the families in their countries of origin (Seibel, 1997). West German recruitment of guest workers ended in 1973. As a result of recruitment and reuniting of families, West German foreign population increased from 680,000 in 1960 to 3,000,000 in 1970 (Seibel, 1997). Within twenty-five years, these foreign residents became a permanent part of West German society with guest worker families giving birth to children who would become a second generation of foreign residents. These second-generation foreign residents were completely integrated into German society, language, and culture with their families giving birth to a third generation of foreign residents. Second-generation and third-generation foreign residents are German in all aspects except their race. Currently, there is an estimated 7.3 million immigrants residing in Germany (Whose Fatherland? A Proposal to Grant Citizenship to Members of Germany’s Vast Immigrant Community Stirs Passionate Debate, 1999), representing around 8% of the German population (Siebel, 1997). And their numbers are growing. One in five babies being born in German society are from non-German citizens (Who is German, 1997). According to Ranier Munz, professor of demographic studies at Humbold University in Berlin, Germany will need 300,000 immigrants a year during the next thirty years to keep it’s population steady (Rinaldi, 1999).
In addition to the immigration of foreign workers for the Wirtchaftswunder, Germany has also accepted immigrants seeking political asylum. In 1947, when the post-war West German constitution was written, a clause was inserted where “politically persecuted persons enjoy the right to asylum.” This is a part of the Grundgestez or Basic Law. This political asylum clause of the Basic Law was set up as a West Germany’s repayment to the world for asylum seekers fleeing the Nazi regime (Siebel, 1997). No other nation has recognized such a liberal and unrestricted right to political asylum. In 1989, 121, 318 asylum seekers entered West Germany. By 1992, the annual figure had risen to 438, 191. This increase in asylum seekers, coupled with economic problems of the reunification of Germany, caused a rise in radical right-winged political groups criticizing the government’s support of asylum seekers. In July 1993, Germany adapted it asylum law rejecting asylum to those immigrants who reached Germany by way of a “safe third country,” and thus cutting off a land route into Germany. Not only did this regulation conform to the policies of other West European countries, but also the number of immigrants seeking asylum dropped in Germany to around 116,367 in 1996 (Siebel, 1997).
While it has been easy for immigrants to enter Germany, it is far more difficult to become a naturalized German citizen. German citizenship laws are adhered to the legal precedent of jus sarguinis or citizenship by blood. To become a German citizen, an individual must be born of German parents or ancestors. This is opposite of the precedent of jus soli where and individual becomes a citizen through birth in a nation-state regardless of ethnicity. Thus, individuals living in Kazakhstan who were descended from ethnic Germans immigrating to Russia around 200 year ago have a greater chance of becoming German citizens over that of a second or third-generation Turkish individuals born in Germany (To the Fatherland: Kazakhstan, 1997). For those who wish to become naturalized citizens who are not of German blood, the requirements are difficult. First, an individual must voluntarily wish to remain in Germany. The individual must have a complete knowledge of German politics and German language. The individual must reside in Germany for a period of 10 years. Finally, an individual must renounce their former citizenship (Kurthen, 1995). This is an important immigration restriction since renunciation of citizenship for Turkish and Polish immigrants will lead to an abandonment of inheritance rights in their countries of origin. As a result of these strict naturalization laws, the annual naturalization ratio is about 3 percent of the 7 million resident aliens living in Germany (Kurthen, 1995). In comparison, the United States ratio is around 6 percent (Kurthen, 1995). Currently, a proposed new law is being backed by German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, which would ease the process of naturalization for residents who are non-German. Called the Dual Nationality Law, this law allows some liberalization in Germany’s naturalized citizenship law. First, a second-generation foreigner born in Germany would automatically become a citizen if at least one parent came there before the age of 14. An immigrant could apply for naturalization after eight years residence instead of 10. Finally, a non-German partner in an intercultural marriage would become a citizen after three years instead of going through naturalization. More importantly, the Dual Nationality Law would not require the renunciation of an individual’s former citizenship.
This aspect of German citizenship laws is slowly creating a class society with foreign immigrants being relegated to a second-class citizenship status. Currently, foreign workers comprise between fifteen and twenty percent of the work force in Germany’s large cities (Siebel, 1997). However, much of the work which immigrants perform is menial work requiring little skills and low pay. According to a study by the RWI Economic Research Institute, 75% of foreigners do menial work which ethnic Germans would avoid, keeping the German economy running with basic food and service industries (Rinaldi, 1999). Turkish immigrants currently run 40,000 small businesses in Germany (Who Is German, 1997) while 10,000 independent kebab food shops manage to outsell McDonalds (Rinaldi, 1999). The demand for small businesses providing ethnic products and services is growing with market analysis estimating a total of 106,000 businesses, which will employ 650,000 by the year 2010 (Hillmann, 1999).
With this growing need of ethnic labor, immigrants may find a life and culture in Germany that is alien to them. The integration of two cultures can become difficult for first-generation immigrants assimilating in Germany. However second and third generation foreigners are also finding them selves caught between two cultures. Foreign children born in Germany are finding a life of confusion. Within the home and family, the social and cultural norms these children learn from their parents come from their parent’s country of origin. But when they enter the German educational system, these children learn of the German prejudices. Foreign children are isolated. They are outsiders in the minds and views of Germans. Attempts to assimilate with German children may also fail. As a result, some foreign children’s interest in learning will sink. They will become autistic or aggressive and their socialization into German society is blocked. Social, cultural, and spiritual stress increases in these children. Many children feel overwhelmed by the stress and view school as a burden rather than an obligation. This can result in a loss of education or withdrawal from school in later years (Onder, 1996). For second and third generation children who are able to assimilated into the German culture and speak the German language, the culture conflict becomes twofold. Not only do they realize the prejudices of the German culture against foreigners, but also they are thrust into a conflict between the German culture they’ve adopted and the ethnic culture of their parents. Disagreements can become violent conflicts between the children who have adopted the German culture and their parents who are culturally bound to their country of origin. Thus second and third generation children are placed into a life of no identity and are forced to culturally fend for themselves (Onder, 1996).
The final problem that immigrants must face is German racism. This modern German racism originated through a combination of factors. First, near the end of the Second World War, the allied powers of the United States, Great Britain, and France, concentrated on de-Nazifying West Germany. What the allied commanders may not have realized is that individual Nazis would have submerged their own racial beliefs and party doctrine within themselves at the end of the war. In East Germany, the Communist government disavowed them selves from having any links with the Nazis past, thus no attempts were made to de-Nazify East Germany by the Soviet Union. Second, the horrors of the Third Reich with the concentration camps and the wholesale slaughter of civilians were consistently reinforced into the West German school curriculum and through West German society. These horrors of the Nazi regime were considered a result of German militarism and German nationalism. Because of these horrors, the West German Government suppressed German nationalism and patriotism. For young Germans who were growing up in the 1960s and 1970s, and who had no memories of the war, the suppression of nationalistic pride and views Germany would cause a backlash against the status quo. This backlash would have been reinforced when the younger Germans learned from their grandparents of how nationalistic German pride existed before the Second World War. It is this lack of nationalistic pride in the younger Germans, which is fertile ground for the tapping by right-winged extremist and neo-Nazi political groups (Krautz, 1993). Bela Ewald Althans, a highly affluent and sophisticated neo-Nazi extremist, has been organizing a grass-roots network of small right-winged extremist parties, skinheads and neo-Nazis into the Die Bewegung or The Movement (Lee, 1993). Althans claims he was influenced by old Nazis and tutored to the Nazi philosophy by Willi Kraemer who was an adviser to Nazi propaganda chief Joseph Goebbels and Major General Otto Ernst Remer, who played a crucial role in stopping the assassination attempt against Hitler in July 1944. Althans was also influenced by Michael Kuhnen, a German army lieutenant who was expelled from the West German army for pro-Nazi agitation in the military. Kuhnen recognized the opportunity to build up a neo-Nazi movement through brandishing resentment of foreigners and guestworkers while projecting strength as an outspoken Nazi, which would attract media attention and followers to his movement. While the German government has banned the Nazi party and has attempted to suppress some of the extreme right-winged parties, Althan’s has carried on Kuhnen’s work, creating through the underground a highly organized German Nazi Party (Lee, 1993). In 1996, over 2,500 racially motivated criminal acts were reported in Germany (Onder, 1996). It is estimated that there are 42,000 right-winged radicals in Germany with 6,200 considered dangerously militant (Marks, 1994).
Finally, the problems with German immigration and the racial views can be identified through German culture. Germans believe that the Aryan race and culture is distinct. Germans believe that their nation is not a nation of immigration. Germany is not a ‘melting pot’ of immigrants as compared to the United States. “In Germany, a kind of unconscious feeling exists that a real German is only a real German by blood and that others can never be part of this country,” said Nora Rathzel, head of the Institute for Migration and Racism in Hamburg (Drohan, 1993). This is the key problem since this mental image of who can be German is causing an unconscious racial view and racial discrimination against different ethnic peoples and cultures. Only when Germany can accept different peoples and culture into her society will she become a much more stronger and democratic nation.
Works Cited
Drohan, Madelaine. (1993). The German Problem. World Press Review. Vol. 40.
No. 2. Pg. 23.
Hillman, Felicitas. (1999). A Look at the “Hidden Side”: Turkish Women in Berlin’s Ethnic Labour Market. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. Vol. 23, Issue 2. Pg. 267.
Krautz, Joachin. (1993). The Grapes of Neglect—Violence and Xenophobia in Germany. Contemporary Review. Vol. 263. No. 1533. Pg. 169.
Kurthen, Hermann. (1995). Germany at the Crossroads: National Identity and the Challenges of Immigration. International Migration Review. Vol. 29. No. 4. Pg. 914.
Lee, Martin A. (1993). Hitler’s Offspring. The Progressive. Vol. 57. No. 3. Pg. 28.
Marks, John. (1994). The Growing Pains of the New Germany; Unification Brings Disorder and Early Sorrow. U.S. News & World Report. Vol. 116. No. 19. Pg. 42.
Onder, Zehra. (1996). Muslim-Turkish Children in Germany: Sociocultural Problems. Migration World Magazine. Vol. 24. No. 5. Pg. 18.
Rinaldi, Alfred. (1999). No Turks, Please, We’re German. New Statesman. Vol. 128. Issue 4417. Pg. 23.
Siebel, Anne Marie. (1997). Deutschland ist doch ein Einwanderungsland Gerworden: Proposals to Address Germany’s Status as a “Land of Immigration.” Vanderbilt Journals of Transnational Law. Vol. 30. No. 4. Pg. 905.
To the Fatherland: Kazakhstan. (1997). The Economist. No. 9. Pg. 47.
Who is German? (1997). The Economist. Vol. 342. No. 8011. Pg. 45.
Whose Fatherland? A Proposal to Grant Citizenship to Members of Germany’s Vast Immigrant Community Stirs Passionate Debate. (1999). Time International. Vol. 153. Issue 3. Pg. 22.
Who Should be German, Then? (1998). The Economist. Vol. 348. No. 8075. Pg. 45.
Democratization
German Immigration and Democratization
A fundamental question is being debated within Germany’s political and cultural society. This question is, ‘Who is German?’ What individual constitutes a German citizen? A stereotypical view of the German citizen could be a blond-haired, blue eyed burly individual who would be good-natured, drink beer, speak with an accent slurring the ‘s’ to a ‘z,’ be militarily precise and hard working, and would dress in Bavarian clothes. Yet foreign immigrants who are incorporating their own customs and mores into German culture and German society are now challenging the view of what constitutes a German citizen. With these clashing views on identity, German immigration has evolved into a split personality. One aspect of the German immigration is to allow foreigners and refugees seeking asylum into the country. And yet at the same time, immigration and naturalization laws make it almost impossible for immigrants to become naturalized German citizens. It is this fractured personality of German laws that have caused immigrants to become the equivalent of second-class citizens. Such a fracture may cause racial conflict within German society.
Immigration into modern Germany started in the 1950s when West Germany began to integrate her economy into the European Common Market. This was the start of the West German Wirtchaftswunder or Economic Miracle. At the end of the Second World War, West Germany’s economy was in the midst of a labor shortage. To combat this labor shortage, West Germany invited thousands of “Gastarbeiter,” or “guest workers” from Mediterranean and Southern European countries to temporarily fill positions in its industrial workforce. These guest workers would help Germany grow in her industry before returning to their original countries. Within the ages of twenty to forty, the Gastarbeiters brought their families over to Germany, rather than sending money back to the families in their countries of origin (Seibel, 1997). West German recruitment of guest workers ended in 1973. As a result of recruitment and reuniting of families, West German foreign population increased from 680,000 in 1960 to 3,000,000 in 1970 (Seibel, 1997). Within twenty-five years, these foreign residents became a permanent part of West German society with guest worker families giving birth to children who would become a second generation of foreign residents. These second-generation foreign residents were completely integrated into German society, language, and culture with their families giving birth to a third generation of foreign residents. Second-generation and third-generation foreign residents are German in all aspects except their race. Currently, there is an estimated 7.3 million immigrants residing in Germany (Whose Fatherland? A Proposal to Grant Citizenship to Members of Germany’s Vast Immigrant Community Stirs Passionate Debate, 1999), representing around 8% of the German population (Siebel, 1997). And their numbers are growing. One in five babies being born in German society are from non-German citizens (Who is German, 1997). According to Ranier Munz, professor of demographic studies at Humbold University in Berlin, Germany will need 300,000 immigrants a year during the next thirty years to keep it’s population steady (Rinaldi, 1999).
In addition to the immigration of foreign workers for the Wirtchaftswunder, Germany has also accepted immigrants seeking political asylum. In 1947, when the post-war West German constitution was written, a clause was inserted where “politically persecuted persons enjoy the right to asylum.” This is a part of the Grundgestez or Basic Law. This political asylum clause of the Basic Law was set up as a West Germany’s repayment to the world for asylum seekers fleeing the Nazi regime (Siebel, 1997). No other nation has recognized such a liberal and unrestricted right to political asylum. In 1989, 121, 318 asylum seekers entered West Germany. By 1992, the annual figure had risen to 438, 191. This increase in asylum seekers, coupled with economic problems of the reunification of Germany, caused a rise in radical right-winged political groups criticizing the government’s support of asylum seekers. In July 1993, Germany adapted it asylum law rejecting asylum to those immigrants who reached Germany by way of a “safe third country,” and thus cutting off a land route into Germany. Not only did this regulation conform to the policies of other West European countries, but also the number of immigrants seeking asylum dropped in Germany to around 116,367 in 1996 (Siebel, 1997).
While it has been easy for immigrants to enter Germany, it is far more difficult to become a naturalized German citizen. German citizenship laws are adhered to the legal precedent of jus sarguinis or citizenship by blood. To become a German citizen, an individual must be born of German parents or ancestors. This is opposite of the precedent of jus soli where and individual becomes a citizen through birth in a nation-state regardless of ethnicity. Thus, individuals living in Kazakhstan who were descended from ethnic Germans immigrating to Russia around 200 year ago have a greater chance of becoming German citizens over that of a second or third-generation Turkish individuals born in Germany (To the Fatherland: Kazakhstan, 1997). For those who wish to become naturalized citizens who are not of German blood, the requirements are difficult. First, an individual must voluntarily wish to remain in Germany. The individual must have a complete knowledge of German politics and German language. The individual must reside in Germany for a period of 10 years. Finally, an individual must renounce their former citizenship (Kurthen, 1995). This is an important immigration restriction since renunciation of citizenship for Turkish and Polish immigrants will lead to an abandonment of inheritance rights in their countries of origin. As a result of these strict naturalization laws, the annual naturalization ratio is about 3 percent of the 7 million resident aliens living in Germany (Kurthen, 1995). In comparison, the United States ratio is around 6 percent (Kurthen, 1995). Currently, a proposed new law is being backed by German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, which would ease the process of naturalization for residents who are non-German. Called the Dual Nationality Law, this law allows some liberalization in Germany’s naturalized citizenship law. First, a second-generation foreigner born in Germany would automatically become a citizen if at least one parent came there before the age of 14. An immigrant could apply for naturalization after eight years residence instead of 10. Finally, a non-German partner in an intercultural marriage would become a citizen after three years instead of going through naturalization. More importantly, the Dual Nationality Law would not require the renunciation of an individual’s former citizenship.
This aspect of German citizenship laws is slowly creating a class society with foreign immigrants being relegated to a second-class citizenship status. Currently, foreign workers comprise between fifteen and twenty percent of the work force in Germany’s large cities (Siebel, 1997). However, much of the work which immigrants perform is menial work requiring little skills and low pay. According to a study by the RWI Economic Research Institute, 75% of foreigners do menial work which ethnic Germans would avoid, keeping the German economy running with basic food and service industries (Rinaldi, 1999). Turkish immigrants currently run 40,000 small businesses in Germany (Who Is German, 1997) while 10,000 independent kebab food shops manage to outsell McDonalds (Rinaldi, 1999). The demand for small businesses providing ethnic products and services is growing with market analysis estimating a total of 106,000 businesses, which will employ 650,000 by the year 2010 (Hillmann, 1999).
With this growing need of ethnic labor, immigrants may find a life and culture in Germany that is alien to them. The integration of two cultures can become difficult for first-generation immigrants assimilating in Germany. However second and third generation foreigners are also finding them selves caught between two cultures. Foreign children born in Germany are finding a life of confusion. Within the home and family, the social and cultural norms these children learn from their parents come from their parent’s country of origin. But when they enter the German educational system, these children learn of the German prejudices. Foreign children are isolated. They are outsiders in the minds and views of Germans. Attempts to assimilate with German children may also fail. As a result, some foreign children’s interest in learning will sink. They will become autistic or aggressive and their socialization into German society is blocked. Social, cultural, and spiritual stress increases in these children. Many children feel overwhelmed by the stress and view school as a burden rather than an obligation. This can result in a loss of education or withdrawal from school in later years (Onder, 1996). For second and third generation children who are able to assimilated into the German culture and speak the German language, the culture conflict becomes twofold. Not only do they realize the prejudices of the German culture against foreigners, but also they are thrust into a conflict between the German culture they’ve adopted and the ethnic culture of their parents. Disagreements can become violent conflicts between the children who have adopted the German culture and their parents who are culturally bound to their country of origin. Thus second and third generation children are placed into a life of no identity and are forced to culturally fend for themselves (Onder, 1996).
The final problem that immigrants must face is German racism. This modern German racism originated through a combination of factors. First, near the end of the Second World War, the allied powers of the United States, Great Britain, and France, concentrated on de-Nazifying West Germany. What the allied commanders may not have realized is that individual Nazis would have submerged their own racial beliefs and party doctrine within themselves at the end of the war. In East Germany, the Communist government disavowed them selves from having any links with the Nazis past, thus no attempts were made to de-Nazify East Germany by the Soviet Union. Second, the horrors of the Third Reich with the concentration camps and the wholesale slaughter of civilians were consistently reinforced into the West German school curriculum and through West German society. These horrors of the Nazi regime were considered a result of German militarism and German nationalism. Because of these horrors, the West German Government suppressed German nationalism and patriotism. For young Germans who were growing up in the 1960s and 1970s, and who had no memories of the war, the suppression of nationalistic pride and views Germany would cause a backlash against the status quo. This backlash would have been reinforced when the younger Germans learned from their grandparents of how nationalistic German pride existed before the Second World War. It is this lack of nationalistic pride in the younger Germans, which is fertile ground for the tapping by right-winged extremist and neo-Nazi political groups (Krautz, 1993). Bela Ewald Althans, a highly affluent and sophisticated neo-Nazi extremist, has been organizing a grass-roots network of small right-winged extremist parties, skinheads and neo-Nazis into the Die Bewegung or The Movement (Lee, 1993). Althans claims he was influenced by old Nazis and tutored to the Nazi philosophy by Willi Kraemer who was an adviser to Nazi propaganda chief Joseph Goebbels and Major General Otto Ernst Remer, who played a crucial role in stopping the assassination attempt against Hitler in July 1944. Althans was also influenced by Michael Kuhnen, a German army lieutenant who was expelled from the West German army for pro-Nazi agitation in the military. Kuhnen recognized the opportunity to build up a neo-Nazi movement through brandishing resentment of foreigners and guestworkers while projecting strength as an outspoken Nazi, which would attract media attention and followers to his movement. While the German government has banned the Nazi party and has attempted to suppress some of the extreme right-winged parties, Althan’s has carried on Kuhnen’s work, creating through the underground a highly organized German Nazi Party (Lee, 1993). In 1996, over 2,500 racially motivated criminal acts were reported in Germany (Onder, 1996). It is estimated that there are 42,000 right-winged radicals in Germany with 6,200 considered dangerously militant (Marks, 1994).
Finally, the problems with German immigration and the racial views can be identified through German culture. Germans believe that the Aryan race and culture is distinct. Germans believe that their nation is not a nation of immigration. Germany is not a ‘melting pot’ of immigrants as compared to the United States. “In Germany, a kind of unconscious feeling exists that a real German is only a real German by blood and that others can never be part of this country,” said Nora Rathzel, head of the Institute for Migration and Racism in Hamburg (Drohan, 1993). This is the key problem since this mental image of who can be German is causing an unconscious racial view and racial discrimination against different ethnic peoples and cultures. Only when Germany can accept different peoples and culture into her society will she become a much more stronger and democratic nation.
Works Cited
Drohan, Madelaine. (1993). The German Problem. World Press Review. Vol. 40.
No. 2. Pg. 23.
Hillman, Felicitas. (1999). A Look at the “Hidden Side”: Turkish Women in Berlin’s Ethnic Labour Market. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. Vol. 23, Issue 2. Pg. 267.
Krautz, Joachin. (1993). The Grapes of Neglect—Violence and Xenophobia in Germany. Contemporary Review. Vol. 263. No. 1533. Pg. 169.
Kurthen, Hermann. (1995). Germany at the Crossroads: National Identity and the Challenges of Immigration. International Migration Review. Vol. 29. No. 4. Pg. 914.
Lee, Martin A. (1993). Hitler’s Offspring. The Progressive. Vol. 57. No. 3. Pg. 28.
Marks, John. (1994). The Growing Pains of the New Germany; Unification Brings Disorder and Early Sorrow. U.S. News & World Report. Vol. 116. No. 19. Pg. 42.
Onder, Zehra. (1996). Muslim-Turkish Children in Germany: Sociocultural Problems. Migration World Magazine. Vol. 24. No. 5. Pg. 18.
Rinaldi, Alfred. (1999). No Turks, Please, We’re German. New Statesman. Vol. 128. Issue 4417. Pg. 23.
Siebel, Anne Marie. (1997). Deutschland ist doch ein Einwanderungsland Gerworden: Proposals to Address Germany’s Status as a “Land of Immigration.” Vanderbilt Journals of Transnational Law. Vol. 30. No. 4. Pg. 905.
To the Fatherland: Kazakhstan. (1997). The Economist. No. 9. Pg. 47.
Who is German? (1997). The Economist. Vol. 342. No. 8011. Pg. 45.
Whose Fatherland? A Proposal to Grant Citizenship to Members of Germany’s Vast Immigrant Community Stirs Passionate Debate. (1999). Time International. Vol. 153. Issue 3. Pg. 22.
Who Should be German, Then? (1998). The Economist. Vol. 348. No. 8075. Pg. 45.
Democratization: Local Politics and Democracy
Political Science 148
Democratization
12-8-99
Democratization: Local Politics and Democracy
This paper is an examination of the protest movement against the World Trade Organization in Seattle and how these protests affected democratization in local American politics.
The World Trade Organization converged on Seattle on the week of November 30 to December 3rd. The purpose of this conference was to allow the trade ministers from 135 member nations to negotiate agreements on reducing tariffs and encouraging trade among the WTO. However, civic activists protesting against the WTO avowed to disrupt the talks and for the next three days, they succeeded. Both violent and non-violent protests movements involving thousands of American citizens marched through the business district of downtown Seattle effectively wreaking havoc on the business district, and creating a protest movement which was eerily reminiscent of the 1960s Vietnam and civil rights protests. The protests wreaked any attempts by the WTO to craft any agreements on the trade issues between members.
The Seattle protests on the WTO are interesting on a number of factors. First, the Seattle protests were a grass roots organization of which most of the protesters attempted to use non-violent means to present their views. This non-violent approach can be traced back to the civil rights movement and groups such as the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, which held workshops where civil rights leaders would train students in non-violent tactics of protests. And yet, the methods used by the protesters today also involved high technology, modern communication and crisis management organization. Take cell phones. Cell phones revolutionized the communications network. Protest leaders using cell phones and city maps could coordinate with other leaders as to the timing of different events, news and intelligence information on law enforcement movements, and even direct logistical movement of protesters to different parts of the city where they could be used most effectively. Video cameras also could play a major role in recording an event in different angles, of which the tapes could be used for documentation, propaganda or even an analysis for strengths and errors, which could be improved for the next movement.
Another factor about the Seattle protests was the lack of a clear message to the WTO. There was no clear message that could be communicated. Instead there were a number of grievances against the WTO of which the messages were diluted over that of the violent nature of the protests. These grievances ranged from the weakening of US labor and environmental laws, corporate greed, genetically altered foods, sweatshops in the Third World, and even conspiracy theories of the WTO becoming a secret world government. This is interesting since the US protest movements usually revolved around a single issue. The theme of the Vietnam protests was to eliminate American political and military involvement in Vietnam. Abortion rights protests the pros and cons of abortion. The feminist’s movement was on equal rights. Yet in Seattle, the protesters were protesting against the WTO, yet each movement has its own reason and argument to protester.
The Seattle protests against the WTO contain some interesting lessons on how future protests can be developed. This protest movement was certainly advanced in the areas of video documentation and communication, the movement leaders would have to create new themes simplified to allow the citizens to memorize and understand these views. Until then, the protest movement may still need to evolve into a movement that could achieve political clout.
Democratization
12-8-99
Democratization: Local Politics and Democracy
This paper is an examination of the protest movement against the World Trade Organization in Seattle and how these protests affected democratization in local American politics.
The World Trade Organization converged on Seattle on the week of November 30 to December 3rd. The purpose of this conference was to allow the trade ministers from 135 member nations to negotiate agreements on reducing tariffs and encouraging trade among the WTO. However, civic activists protesting against the WTO avowed to disrupt the talks and for the next three days, they succeeded. Both violent and non-violent protests movements involving thousands of American citizens marched through the business district of downtown Seattle effectively wreaking havoc on the business district, and creating a protest movement which was eerily reminiscent of the 1960s Vietnam and civil rights protests. The protests wreaked any attempts by the WTO to craft any agreements on the trade issues between members.
The Seattle protests on the WTO are interesting on a number of factors. First, the Seattle protests were a grass roots organization of which most of the protesters attempted to use non-violent means to present their views. This non-violent approach can be traced back to the civil rights movement and groups such as the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee, which held workshops where civil rights leaders would train students in non-violent tactics of protests. And yet, the methods used by the protesters today also involved high technology, modern communication and crisis management organization. Take cell phones. Cell phones revolutionized the communications network. Protest leaders using cell phones and city maps could coordinate with other leaders as to the timing of different events, news and intelligence information on law enforcement movements, and even direct logistical movement of protesters to different parts of the city where they could be used most effectively. Video cameras also could play a major role in recording an event in different angles, of which the tapes could be used for documentation, propaganda or even an analysis for strengths and errors, which could be improved for the next movement.
Another factor about the Seattle protests was the lack of a clear message to the WTO. There was no clear message that could be communicated. Instead there were a number of grievances against the WTO of which the messages were diluted over that of the violent nature of the protests. These grievances ranged from the weakening of US labor and environmental laws, corporate greed, genetically altered foods, sweatshops in the Third World, and even conspiracy theories of the WTO becoming a secret world government. This is interesting since the US protest movements usually revolved around a single issue. The theme of the Vietnam protests was to eliminate American political and military involvement in Vietnam. Abortion rights protests the pros and cons of abortion. The feminist’s movement was on equal rights. Yet in Seattle, the protesters were protesting against the WTO, yet each movement has its own reason and argument to protester.
The Seattle protests against the WTO contain some interesting lessons on how future protests can be developed. This protest movement was certainly advanced in the areas of video documentation and communication, the movement leaders would have to create new themes simplified to allow the citizens to memorize and understand these views. Until then, the protest movement may still need to evolve into a movement that could achieve political clout.
Democratization in Germany, South Africa, and Mexico
Political Science 148
Democratization
Democratization in Germany, South Africa, and Mexico
The three societies of Germany, South Africa and Mexico have in the process of the last fifty years have evolved into more open and democratic societies. In order to understand this process, one must understand what the measurement of change is in. There should be two distinct measurements of change to judge a nation in how they practice democratization. The first measurement of change would be economic conditions. A nation should allow its citizens to live, work and prosper in its territory. This should include giving the people a living wage for which they can prosper, some social security or retirement benefits, economic opportunities, vocational or training programs to give the people the skills needed to compete, as well as worker protections. The state should also provide for some basic welfare services to allow those who are impoverished to be able to brought out of poverty and become productive members of society. The second measurement should be political considerations. The state should provide its citizens with basic freedoms and human rights of which they cannot be taken back. Such human rights would be the freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly. A state should also provide for the right to vote and give every citizen an opportunity to participate in civic affairs. Finally, men and women should be treated in an equal and fair manner. While these definitions are not absolute, they can serve as a basic guide to determine how Germany, South Africa and Mexico in their process of democratization.
The first country—Germany—has advanced tremendously in democratization. Fifty years ago, the Second World War devastated Germany. The Nazi government was responsible for the senseless slaughter of people based on racial ethnicity with a particular emphasis on the extinction of the Jewish race. However, within the next 50 years, Germany built itself up into a modern industrial state. Germans traditionally believe in sharing with each other in a paternalistic means from the top down. This can be traced back to the Yonkers or German elite who started to industrialize the German states. Germans believed that government could be helpful and beneficial to the people. Germans believe that the right of an individual is not absolute. An individual is in a relationship with the community and is equal in that community. The individual does not stand alone outside of the community. This is important since it is the community and not the individual, which interprets the morality of laws. Germany is a highly modern, industrialized society with an advanced social welfare state which provides its people with a minimum living wage, unemployment benefits, social security, job training, maternity leave with pay, and basic human rights and freedoms. However, Germany does have one major problem. Germans still believe in citizenship by blood—you are a German citizen if your parents were Germans. And individual of another race could not be German if they were born here. This is a major problem since Germany allowed open borders for immigration in its Basic Law as well as inviting foreigners into the nation during the 1950s “Economic Miracle.” A sizable portion of Turkish guest workers that immigrated to Germany stayed and assimilated into German society and culture, raising children. Yet these guest workers could not become naturalized German citizens since they did not have German ancestry. So while Germany has provided a strong economy with an efficient social welfare state, an old citizenship law, which claims naturalization only through blood, has not allowed Germany to establish true democratization.
With the country of South Africa, the roles have been reversed. For much of the South African existence, the government instituted a government system of racial discrimination called apartheid. Apartheid was a government-sponsored program, which formally separated whites, black native Africans and coloreds by their racial characteristics. More importantly, apartheid also provided the whites got 93% of the best land including prime farmland and a main industrial base of South Africa—even though the white population was around 25% if the total South African population. The blacks, which made up 75% if South African population, received less than 6% of South Africa’s land which was rural desert. With a combination of external pressures of a world trade embargo protesting the apartheid policy to internal pressures of maintaining apartheid through growing violence and riots in the black homelands while white businesses couldn’t find skilled black labor to fill their industrial system, South Africa finally dismantled the apartheid system in 1990. An interim national government headed by South African President F.W. De Klerk and Nelson Mandela, president of the African National Congress, worked on creating a system of government which initiated an orderly transfer of power between the white minority government and the black citizens while ensuring both races received fair representation in the new South African government. De Klerk and Madela succeeded. South Africa became a full democracy. However, South Africa has major economic problems. A large number of the black population living in the homelands has little education and no job skills or training to compete in an industrial society. They are unemployed, homeless and have no skills. Currently the South African government is debating on how to resolve the economic conditions of black South Africans.
The third nation Mexico provides a unique case between balancing both economic and political concerns for the Mexican people. Mexico has been a developing nation during its modern history. It was a democracy, however only one party—the PRI--could run for elections. While Mexico had a simple welfare system, the system was deregulated to allow for free market expansion to take effect in the 1980s. In the mid 1990s, the Mexican economy collapsed into a deep recession. One important problem of Mexico is that income redistribution has shifted away from the poor and working class, transferring the wealth to an already rich class. This deteriorating system of income redistribution is a main obstacle to improving Mexico’s economic conditions. Income distribution is shifting geographically as well. The northern states in Mexico are economically advanced, industrialized, and homogeneous while the southern states are agricultural with subsistence farmers, rural and controlled by the PRI. Because of this income distribution, Mexico is becoming segregated with a rich and democratic north containing the wealth, and a poor, autocratic south with little wealth. This is causing a violent uprising of Mayan peasants requesting land reform in Chiapas, which has erupted into a revolt between the Chapas and the Mexican army.
While Germany, South Africa and Mexico have not adapted to an ideal standard of a democratic nation, these three nations are working to develop their own unique forms of democracy. As they continue to evolve in their social structures, a democratization process will continue to allow the people in these three nations live in a free society.
Democratization
Democratization in Germany, South Africa, and Mexico
The three societies of Germany, South Africa and Mexico have in the process of the last fifty years have evolved into more open and democratic societies. In order to understand this process, one must understand what the measurement of change is in. There should be two distinct measurements of change to judge a nation in how they practice democratization. The first measurement of change would be economic conditions. A nation should allow its citizens to live, work and prosper in its territory. This should include giving the people a living wage for which they can prosper, some social security or retirement benefits, economic opportunities, vocational or training programs to give the people the skills needed to compete, as well as worker protections. The state should also provide for some basic welfare services to allow those who are impoverished to be able to brought out of poverty and become productive members of society. The second measurement should be political considerations. The state should provide its citizens with basic freedoms and human rights of which they cannot be taken back. Such human rights would be the freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly. A state should also provide for the right to vote and give every citizen an opportunity to participate in civic affairs. Finally, men and women should be treated in an equal and fair manner. While these definitions are not absolute, they can serve as a basic guide to determine how Germany, South Africa and Mexico in their process of democratization.
The first country—Germany—has advanced tremendously in democratization. Fifty years ago, the Second World War devastated Germany. The Nazi government was responsible for the senseless slaughter of people based on racial ethnicity with a particular emphasis on the extinction of the Jewish race. However, within the next 50 years, Germany built itself up into a modern industrial state. Germans traditionally believe in sharing with each other in a paternalistic means from the top down. This can be traced back to the Yonkers or German elite who started to industrialize the German states. Germans believed that government could be helpful and beneficial to the people. Germans believe that the right of an individual is not absolute. An individual is in a relationship with the community and is equal in that community. The individual does not stand alone outside of the community. This is important since it is the community and not the individual, which interprets the morality of laws. Germany is a highly modern, industrialized society with an advanced social welfare state which provides its people with a minimum living wage, unemployment benefits, social security, job training, maternity leave with pay, and basic human rights and freedoms. However, Germany does have one major problem. Germans still believe in citizenship by blood—you are a German citizen if your parents were Germans. And individual of another race could not be German if they were born here. This is a major problem since Germany allowed open borders for immigration in its Basic Law as well as inviting foreigners into the nation during the 1950s “Economic Miracle.” A sizable portion of Turkish guest workers that immigrated to Germany stayed and assimilated into German society and culture, raising children. Yet these guest workers could not become naturalized German citizens since they did not have German ancestry. So while Germany has provided a strong economy with an efficient social welfare state, an old citizenship law, which claims naturalization only through blood, has not allowed Germany to establish true democratization.
With the country of South Africa, the roles have been reversed. For much of the South African existence, the government instituted a government system of racial discrimination called apartheid. Apartheid was a government-sponsored program, which formally separated whites, black native Africans and coloreds by their racial characteristics. More importantly, apartheid also provided the whites got 93% of the best land including prime farmland and a main industrial base of South Africa—even though the white population was around 25% if the total South African population. The blacks, which made up 75% if South African population, received less than 6% of South Africa’s land which was rural desert. With a combination of external pressures of a world trade embargo protesting the apartheid policy to internal pressures of maintaining apartheid through growing violence and riots in the black homelands while white businesses couldn’t find skilled black labor to fill their industrial system, South Africa finally dismantled the apartheid system in 1990. An interim national government headed by South African President F.W. De Klerk and Nelson Mandela, president of the African National Congress, worked on creating a system of government which initiated an orderly transfer of power between the white minority government and the black citizens while ensuring both races received fair representation in the new South African government. De Klerk and Madela succeeded. South Africa became a full democracy. However, South Africa has major economic problems. A large number of the black population living in the homelands has little education and no job skills or training to compete in an industrial society. They are unemployed, homeless and have no skills. Currently the South African government is debating on how to resolve the economic conditions of black South Africans.
The third nation Mexico provides a unique case between balancing both economic and political concerns for the Mexican people. Mexico has been a developing nation during its modern history. It was a democracy, however only one party—the PRI--could run for elections. While Mexico had a simple welfare system, the system was deregulated to allow for free market expansion to take effect in the 1980s. In the mid 1990s, the Mexican economy collapsed into a deep recession. One important problem of Mexico is that income redistribution has shifted away from the poor and working class, transferring the wealth to an already rich class. This deteriorating system of income redistribution is a main obstacle to improving Mexico’s economic conditions. Income distribution is shifting geographically as well. The northern states in Mexico are economically advanced, industrialized, and homogeneous while the southern states are agricultural with subsistence farmers, rural and controlled by the PRI. Because of this income distribution, Mexico is becoming segregated with a rich and democratic north containing the wealth, and a poor, autocratic south with little wealth. This is causing a violent uprising of Mayan peasants requesting land reform in Chiapas, which has erupted into a revolt between the Chapas and the Mexican army.
While Germany, South Africa and Mexico have not adapted to an ideal standard of a democratic nation, these three nations are working to develop their own unique forms of democracy. As they continue to evolve in their social structures, a democratization process will continue to allow the people in these three nations live in a free society.
Controversial Legal Subject: Abortion
Political Science 20
Controversial Legal Issues
Controversial Legal Subject: Abortion
On January 23, 1973, the Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision that gave women the constitutional right to perform an abortion to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. Since the decision of Roe v. Wade, the issue of abortion has been constantly challenged and debated in the courts and in American society. Abortion is not a simple abstract issue. Abortion is complex issue which delves into the perspectives of morals, ethics, religion, sex, discrimination, privacy—perspectives that are challenged and swayed not through the cold logic of reasoning, but rather the hot fires of emotion.
I. QUESTION PRESENTED:
Should abortion be protected by the Constitution?
II. ARGUMENTS PRO:
A. Argument One:
Abortion is a symptom and not the defining cause for the social problems in United States society.
1. With the rise of the Religious Right in the 1980s, conservatives attempted to politically link abortion with societal problems. No evidence exists which suggests a casual relationship linking abortion with other domestic problems such as domestic violence, birth control or welfare. However, there is a political linkage created by the conservative movement blaming abortion as the cause of societal problems. With this political linkage, conservatives can attack domestic programs on welfare, family planning and birth control. Between 1980 and 1990, the number of federally supported family planning clinics dropped from 5,000 to 4,000 clinics. In addition, federal funding to family planning clinics dropped from $162 million to 144 million (Joffe, 1997).
2. A total of 84 percent of U.S. counties lack abortion facilities. However, 70 percent of women of childbearing age live in counties with abortion facilities and 30 percent of women live in rural counties (Whitman, 1998).
3. The state of New Jersey passed a welfare reform bill, which included a “family cap.” If a woman on welfare became pregnant and chose to carry the child to term, she would not receive additional state money for that child. Abortion rates in New Jersey among welfare women increased by 6 percent from 27.1 abortions per 1,000 in 1990 to about 28.8 abortions per 1,000 in 1996. This contradicted New Jersey’s overall abortion rate, which declined since 1990 by 24.4 percent from 4.5 abortions per 1,000 to 3.4 abortions (Kelly, 1999). This welfare reform bill was challenged by pro-life groups such as the New Jersey Right To Life, New Jersey Citizens for Life, and New Jersey State Catholic Conference and pro-choice groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union, the New Jersey Civil Liberties Union, and the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, creating an unusual coalition between pro-life and pro-choice groups against the family cap (Kelly, 1999).
B. Argument Two:
If abortion is outlawed, abortions will continue to be performed in illegal “back street” operations that may cause dangers to a women’s health.
1. While abortion is outlawed in much of Latin America, about 4 million abortions were performed in Latin America in appalling circumstances in 1990 (Rayas, 1998). In Chile, where abortion is illegal, an estimated 160,000 to 300,000 Chilean women undergo abortions each year (Rayas, 1998).
2. Around 1 million to 4.4 million abortions are performed among women under the age of 20 in developing countries in the Third World (Unsafe Abortion Increasing Among Young Women, 1998).
3. Between 50-60 percent of women in Latin America who try to induce abortions themselves or with the assistance of non-medical personnel, experience complications, causing 800,000 Latin American women to be admitted into hospitals each year as a result of these complications. In Chile, 36% of maternal deaths are a result of illegal abortions (Rayas, 1998).
C. Argument Three:
While anti-abortionists regard humans as being human in a biological sense, other societies in the world regard a human as being a human in a socialization sense.
1. Sociologist George Herbert Meade contended that an individual was not born human, but rather the individual’s self-awareness was learned through interaction and socialization in human society.
2. The Ashanti of West Africa name a newborn only after seven days at which the child becomes part of the social group. The Todas in southern India regard an individual to be human after 3 months where they will then give a name to the child (Smith, 1996). Both societies regard social development as a criterion for a child to become human and before the child is established into the social group, the child is considered a non-person.
III. ARGUMENTS CON:
A. Argument One:
Abortion is the killing of human life.
1. Between 1973 to 1999, approximately one child was aborted for every three children born (Mathewes-Green, 1998).
2. Since 1973, there has been an accumulation of over 30 million abortions in the United States (Chapat, 1999).
3. The names of each child aborted would fill the Vietnam Veteran’s Memorial Wall around 700 times (Mathewes-Green, 1998).
B. Argument Two:
Continued legalization of abortion would cause the United States to descend the slippery slope of state-sanctioned killing and genocide.
1. Novak (1997) claims, “Any principle accepted for the beginning of life will logically be applied by the Courts to the end of life. If private citizens can terminate the life of one human being at the beginning, some will claim the same right to terminate the life of another at the end.” Novak links the controversy of abortion with the new controversy of physician-assisted suicide. Not only would doctors have the right to terminate the human life of an unborn child, but also Novak fears that doctors could have the legal right to terminate the human life of an elderly individual.
2. In the Netherlands, of the 3,600 cases of physician-assisted suicide in 1996, approximately 1,000 cases were non-voluntary suicides. In addition, a study of nursing home patients’ show that 41 percent of doctors did not adhere to the strict guidelines for physician assisted suicides in the Netherlands (Emanuel, 1997).
3. In addition, Chaput (1999) argues that while compromise is important in a democracy, such compromise can never be seceded from the core values and principles, which a democracy cherishes. A compromise, which diminishes the core values of a democratic society, will end up fracturing the society and in the end, destroy the values and principles that the democratic society cherishes.
C. Argument Three:
Abortion violates John Locke’s theory of the social contract.
1. John Locke’s social contract theorizes that humans are animalistic in a state of nature. Humans enter into a civil society by removing all acts of violence out of the private hands and entrusting the acts of violence to public authorities. This protects all members of a civil society. Novak (1997) argues that abortion allows the woman to legally kill a human fetus through an act of violence in private hands, thus violating the social contract.
2. Novak finally concludes that abortion allows the individual and society to treat the human fetus as a thing or object rather than as a human individual. By treating the human fetus as a “thing” rather than as an individual, American society is also violating the unborn child’s basic constitutional rights, reiterating the slippery slope argument of abortion killing off unborn children and euthanasia killing off the elderly (1997).
V1. CONCLUSION:
The abortion debate between the pro-life and pro-choice groups clearly shows a lack of understanding which each group has over the opposing group’s viewpoint and their concerns over abortion. A yawning chasm has cracked between both groups, making it difficult for either side to accept compromise. What is ironic is that American’s view the subject with contradictory opinions. According to Hunt (1998), American’s consider abortion as “murder,” yet they feel that abortion is a private, moral decision for the woman and it is a legal “right” which the government should not criminalize. This constitutes a middle ground in the opinion of abortion. Abortion should be used as a last resort effort in birth control with certain restrictions place on it. These restrictions can be practical in that they allow the woman to fully comprehend the significance of the act—such restrictions could be a family counseling session, a 24-hour waiting period, and minors must have parental consent before undergoing an abortion. Abortion should be just one option in the family planning decisions that is confronted between a man and woman. It is a private matter for the man and woman to decide. At the same time, with 1.5 million abortions being performed in a year, abortion has become a callous form of birth control for which it was not meant to be. The sheer number of abortions is also causing a concern among Americans, allowing support for restrictions on abortion. That is the problem of abortion. It was meant as a last resort to terminate an unwanted pregnancy if other methods of birth control had failed. However, since Roe v. Wade, abortion became one of the prime methods of birth control. Its continued existence—whether legally entitled or restricted—is the prime reason why both the pro-life and pro-choice sides cannot reach an agreement with each other. As long as abortion remains in the forefront of American social and political debate, the issue will never be resolved.
Works Cited
Chaput, C. (1999). Sanctity of Life Demands No Compromise. National Catholic Reporter. Vol. 35, pg. 21.
Emanuel, E. (1997). Whose Right to Die? The Atlantic Monthly. Vol. 279, pg. 73-79.
Hunt, G.W. (1998). Of Many Things. America. Vol. 178, pg. 2
Joffe, C. (1997). Abortion as Single Issue Politics. Society. Vol. 34, pg. 25.
Kelly, J. R. (1999). Common Ground for Pro-Life and Pro-Choice. America. Vol. 180, pg. 8.
Mathewes-Green, F. (1998). Wanted: A New Pro-Life Strategy: Twenty-five Years After Roe, and 37 Million Abortions Later, We Have to Admit We are Losing the Fight. Christianity Today. Vol. 42, pg. 26.
Novak, M. (1997). Personally Opposed: When Politicians Profess a Personal Opposition to Abortion, The Appropriate Answer is a Question. National Review. Vol. 49, pg. 4.
Rayas, L. (1998). Criminalizing Abortions: A Crime Against Women. NACLAA Report on the Americas. Vol. 31, pg. 22.
Smith, N. W. (1996). The Abortion Issue and Selecting a Criterion of “Life.” Free Inquiry. Vol. 16, pg. 29.
Unsafe Abortions Increasing Among Young Women. (1998). Win News. Vol. 24, pg. 4.
Whitman, D. (1998). Abortion: The Untold Story. U.S. News And World Report. Pg. 20.
Controversial Legal Issues
Controversial Legal Subject: Abortion
On January 23, 1973, the Supreme Court handed down a landmark decision that gave women the constitutional right to perform an abortion to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. Since the decision of Roe v. Wade, the issue of abortion has been constantly challenged and debated in the courts and in American society. Abortion is not a simple abstract issue. Abortion is complex issue which delves into the perspectives of morals, ethics, religion, sex, discrimination, privacy—perspectives that are challenged and swayed not through the cold logic of reasoning, but rather the hot fires of emotion.
I. QUESTION PRESENTED:
Should abortion be protected by the Constitution?
II. ARGUMENTS PRO:
A. Argument One:
Abortion is a symptom and not the defining cause for the social problems in United States society.
1. With the rise of the Religious Right in the 1980s, conservatives attempted to politically link abortion with societal problems. No evidence exists which suggests a casual relationship linking abortion with other domestic problems such as domestic violence, birth control or welfare. However, there is a political linkage created by the conservative movement blaming abortion as the cause of societal problems. With this political linkage, conservatives can attack domestic programs on welfare, family planning and birth control. Between 1980 and 1990, the number of federally supported family planning clinics dropped from 5,000 to 4,000 clinics. In addition, federal funding to family planning clinics dropped from $162 million to 144 million (Joffe, 1997).
2. A total of 84 percent of U.S. counties lack abortion facilities. However, 70 percent of women of childbearing age live in counties with abortion facilities and 30 percent of women live in rural counties (Whitman, 1998).
3. The state of New Jersey passed a welfare reform bill, which included a “family cap.” If a woman on welfare became pregnant and chose to carry the child to term, she would not receive additional state money for that child. Abortion rates in New Jersey among welfare women increased by 6 percent from 27.1 abortions per 1,000 in 1990 to about 28.8 abortions per 1,000 in 1996. This contradicted New Jersey’s overall abortion rate, which declined since 1990 by 24.4 percent from 4.5 abortions per 1,000 to 3.4 abortions (Kelly, 1999). This welfare reform bill was challenged by pro-life groups such as the New Jersey Right To Life, New Jersey Citizens for Life, and New Jersey State Catholic Conference and pro-choice groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union, the New Jersey Civil Liberties Union, and the NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund, creating an unusual coalition between pro-life and pro-choice groups against the family cap (Kelly, 1999).
B. Argument Two:
If abortion is outlawed, abortions will continue to be performed in illegal “back street” operations that may cause dangers to a women’s health.
1. While abortion is outlawed in much of Latin America, about 4 million abortions were performed in Latin America in appalling circumstances in 1990 (Rayas, 1998). In Chile, where abortion is illegal, an estimated 160,000 to 300,000 Chilean women undergo abortions each year (Rayas, 1998).
2. Around 1 million to 4.4 million abortions are performed among women under the age of 20 in developing countries in the Third World (Unsafe Abortion Increasing Among Young Women, 1998).
3. Between 50-60 percent of women in Latin America who try to induce abortions themselves or with the assistance of non-medical personnel, experience complications, causing 800,000 Latin American women to be admitted into hospitals each year as a result of these complications. In Chile, 36% of maternal deaths are a result of illegal abortions (Rayas, 1998).
C. Argument Three:
While anti-abortionists regard humans as being human in a biological sense, other societies in the world regard a human as being a human in a socialization sense.
1. Sociologist George Herbert Meade contended that an individual was not born human, but rather the individual’s self-awareness was learned through interaction and socialization in human society.
2. The Ashanti of West Africa name a newborn only after seven days at which the child becomes part of the social group. The Todas in southern India regard an individual to be human after 3 months where they will then give a name to the child (Smith, 1996). Both societies regard social development as a criterion for a child to become human and before the child is established into the social group, the child is considered a non-person.
III. ARGUMENTS CON:
A. Argument One:
Abortion is the killing of human life.
1. Between 1973 to 1999, approximately one child was aborted for every three children born (Mathewes-Green, 1998).
2. Since 1973, there has been an accumulation of over 30 million abortions in the United States (Chapat, 1999).
3. The names of each child aborted would fill the Vietnam Veteran’s Memorial Wall around 700 times (Mathewes-Green, 1998).
B. Argument Two:
Continued legalization of abortion would cause the United States to descend the slippery slope of state-sanctioned killing and genocide.
1. Novak (1997) claims, “Any principle accepted for the beginning of life will logically be applied by the Courts to the end of life. If private citizens can terminate the life of one human being at the beginning, some will claim the same right to terminate the life of another at the end.” Novak links the controversy of abortion with the new controversy of physician-assisted suicide. Not only would doctors have the right to terminate the human life of an unborn child, but also Novak fears that doctors could have the legal right to terminate the human life of an elderly individual.
2. In the Netherlands, of the 3,600 cases of physician-assisted suicide in 1996, approximately 1,000 cases were non-voluntary suicides. In addition, a study of nursing home patients’ show that 41 percent of doctors did not adhere to the strict guidelines for physician assisted suicides in the Netherlands (Emanuel, 1997).
3. In addition, Chaput (1999) argues that while compromise is important in a democracy, such compromise can never be seceded from the core values and principles, which a democracy cherishes. A compromise, which diminishes the core values of a democratic society, will end up fracturing the society and in the end, destroy the values and principles that the democratic society cherishes.
C. Argument Three:
Abortion violates John Locke’s theory of the social contract.
1. John Locke’s social contract theorizes that humans are animalistic in a state of nature. Humans enter into a civil society by removing all acts of violence out of the private hands and entrusting the acts of violence to public authorities. This protects all members of a civil society. Novak (1997) argues that abortion allows the woman to legally kill a human fetus through an act of violence in private hands, thus violating the social contract.
2. Novak finally concludes that abortion allows the individual and society to treat the human fetus as a thing or object rather than as a human individual. By treating the human fetus as a “thing” rather than as an individual, American society is also violating the unborn child’s basic constitutional rights, reiterating the slippery slope argument of abortion killing off unborn children and euthanasia killing off the elderly (1997).
V1. CONCLUSION:
The abortion debate between the pro-life and pro-choice groups clearly shows a lack of understanding which each group has over the opposing group’s viewpoint and their concerns over abortion. A yawning chasm has cracked between both groups, making it difficult for either side to accept compromise. What is ironic is that American’s view the subject with contradictory opinions. According to Hunt (1998), American’s consider abortion as “murder,” yet they feel that abortion is a private, moral decision for the woman and it is a legal “right” which the government should not criminalize. This constitutes a middle ground in the opinion of abortion. Abortion should be used as a last resort effort in birth control with certain restrictions place on it. These restrictions can be practical in that they allow the woman to fully comprehend the significance of the act—such restrictions could be a family counseling session, a 24-hour waiting period, and minors must have parental consent before undergoing an abortion. Abortion should be just one option in the family planning decisions that is confronted between a man and woman. It is a private matter for the man and woman to decide. At the same time, with 1.5 million abortions being performed in a year, abortion has become a callous form of birth control for which it was not meant to be. The sheer number of abortions is also causing a concern among Americans, allowing support for restrictions on abortion. That is the problem of abortion. It was meant as a last resort to terminate an unwanted pregnancy if other methods of birth control had failed. However, since Roe v. Wade, abortion became one of the prime methods of birth control. Its continued existence—whether legally entitled or restricted—is the prime reason why both the pro-life and pro-choice sides cannot reach an agreement with each other. As long as abortion remains in the forefront of American social and political debate, the issue will never be resolved.
Works Cited
Chaput, C. (1999). Sanctity of Life Demands No Compromise. National Catholic Reporter. Vol. 35, pg. 21.
Emanuel, E. (1997). Whose Right to Die? The Atlantic Monthly. Vol. 279, pg. 73-79.
Hunt, G.W. (1998). Of Many Things. America. Vol. 178, pg. 2
Joffe, C. (1997). Abortion as Single Issue Politics. Society. Vol. 34, pg. 25.
Kelly, J. R. (1999). Common Ground for Pro-Life and Pro-Choice. America. Vol. 180, pg. 8.
Mathewes-Green, F. (1998). Wanted: A New Pro-Life Strategy: Twenty-five Years After Roe, and 37 Million Abortions Later, We Have to Admit We are Losing the Fight. Christianity Today. Vol. 42, pg. 26.
Novak, M. (1997). Personally Opposed: When Politicians Profess a Personal Opposition to Abortion, The Appropriate Answer is a Question. National Review. Vol. 49, pg. 4.
Rayas, L. (1998). Criminalizing Abortions: A Crime Against Women. NACLAA Report on the Americas. Vol. 31, pg. 22.
Smith, N. W. (1996). The Abortion Issue and Selecting a Criterion of “Life.” Free Inquiry. Vol. 16, pg. 29.
Unsafe Abortions Increasing Among Young Women. (1998). Win News. Vol. 24, pg. 4.
Whitman, D. (1998). Abortion: The Untold Story. U.S. News And World Report. Pg. 20.
Conflict Diamonds
Economics 136
International Economics
Economics Research Paper: Conflict Diamonds
Diamonds. One of the hardest substances known to man, a diamond is basically carbon compressed to a crystalline form. It glitters and sparkles in a dazzling brilliance. It is the oldest and most precious of all minerals. A diamond now signifies a never-ending love and commitment between newlyweds, starting with a gift of an engagement ring, and culminating to the 75th wedding anniversary diamond. To quote a famous song line, “Diamonds are a girl’s best friend.”
But there is a darker side to a diamond’s sparkle. It is a side of death, of war, of smuggled profits and riches to few, and economic poverty and misery to many. These are the conflict or “blood” diamonds. Conflict diamonds are rough diamonds mined and smuggled out of the African states of Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo by rebel organizations, which then utilize the proceeds from the sales of these smuggled diamonds to finance their military operations against the legitimate African governments of these states. This paper is divided into three parts. The first part defines how conflict diamonds are mined and smuggled out of Africa. The second part examines the link between conflict diamonds and weapons purchases. Finally, there is an analysis of conflict diamonds and how to reduce their presence in the world markets.
Conflict diamonds comprised an estimated 3.7% to 15% of the value of global diamond trade in 2000 (Cook, 2003). In 2001, the production of rough diamonds was estimated to be around $7.885 billion, with the United States importing $597.38 million of rough diamonds in 2001 (Cook, 2003). Cook estimated the total value of worked, but uncounted diamonds imported into the United States to be even larger than that of rough diamonds at $10.06 billion in 2001. Goreux stated that rough diamonds purchased at the mine gates in 1999 were valued at $7.3 billion (2001). Diamonds sorted, polished and then sold to jewelers were valued at $14 billion. When jewelers add gold, platinum, and precious stones other than diamonds, this increases the costs by another $14 billion, bringing total production costs to $28 billion. Add a 100 percent retail profit margin, and Goreux estimated the value paid by consumers of diamond jewelry to be around $56 billion worldwide (Goreux, 2001). This increasingly stream of revenue in the diamond market provides a powerful incentive for individuals to profit in the sales of conflict diamonds.
Before any analysis of conflict diamonds can start, a few words must be said about De Beers Corporation. De Beers is the dominant force within the diamond industry. For almost 70 years, De Beers has created a diamond cartel by carefully maintaining the pricing and supply of diamonds in the world market. It has achieved this cartel by owning over 40 percent of the diamond mines and a large buffer-stock of unpolished diamonds, almost to the equivalent to a full year of world production in 1998 (Goreux, 2000). However, new supplies of diamonds have been discovered in Canada and Australia. This increase in supply has threatened De Beer’s control of world prices. The company has released its control of world prices and has reduced its buffer stock from $5 billion in 1998 to less than $3 billion in 2000 (Goreux, 2000). De Beers originally started its successful “A diamond is forever” marketing campaign, but as both new independent suppliers took advantage of the free De Beers advertising, and as the issue of conflict diamonds received greater public awareness, De Beers adapted it strategy. De Beers stopped buying diamonds on the open market in Africa and in Antwerp—the world’s diamond trading capital—and instead relied on the supply in its own mines and in joint ventures with local producers (Soggot, 2002). De Beers created a new concept of “branded diamonds,” where diamonds are engraved with De Beers’ brand on special machinery, guaranteeing that the stones are conflict free (Soggot, 2002). This strategy allowed De Beers to project a new image as “the Supplier of choice,” (Goreux, 2000).
Mining diamonds are classified by two processes—kimberlite and alluvial. Kimberlite mining occurs where the diamonds are mined from the volcanic pipes, which push the diamond-rich magma to the surface. Once the diamond material is exposed to weathering and erosion, it is broken apart and carried down through rivers and streams to alluvial, or stream bed, deposits (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification and Control of Diamonds, 2000). What is important to note is that kimberlite mining requires advanced mining technology and capital necessary either to utilize heavy mining machinery to dig down into the volcanic crater to access the exposed kimberlite, or to develop the underground mine shafts in order to tap these diamond-rich volcanic pipes. Such mining can only be done by a national government, or large mining corporations, which must develop economic and business relationships with the current government of the state in order to access the resources within the territory of that state. Rebel organizations involved in a dispute against the state, do not have the knowledge, technology, or skills necessary to capitalize on these resources. However, alluvial diamonds are located on the surface of streams or riverbeds. They can be picked up, or dug up using rudimentary tools such as pick-axes or shovels. Alluvial diamond mining is basically small-scale, or artisan in nature (Goreux, 2001). It is practiced in poor and remote areas by a largely itinerant and poorly educated population with little employment opportunities. Goreux estimated that 13 million people in about 30 countries are small-scale/artisan miners (2001). Mining conditions are harsh, unhealthy, and the artisan miners are poorly paid. There is no health insurance, no legal, labor, or fiscal regulations. Goreux said that a sizable part of the artisan mining population consists of young male workers living in an insecure environment (2001). Artisan mining provides an income for those young males to spend on widely available illicit drugs and the sex trade (Goreux, 2001). Blaine Harden described an account where a digger Miki Galedem, 30, had found a rough stone of nine carats in a Congolese streambed, when he was 16 in 1993 (2000). He was paid $4,800 for the stone, but Galedem wasted the money on “beer and women,” (Harden, 2000). With artisan diamond mining, the rules are that the guy with the gun gets the diamond (Harden, 2000). Harden said of a digger Mati Balemo finding a diamond about the size of a raisin after digging for an hour in the mud. Diamond traders in Kisangani would pay about $20 for the stone. “ ‘I’m very glad,’ Mr. Balemo said, not smiling much. This was the first diamond in nearly a week. ‘It’s not much money for all that work.’ The soldier with the stubby machine gun, who had been watching closely from the riverbank, came over and took the diamond. He folded it into a scrap of paper backed with gold foil and stuffed the packet into his chest pocket,” (Harden, 2000).
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, diamond mining is also undertaken using the artisan mining process. While mining of diamonds could take place in the 1980s, the selling of diamonds was restricted within the mining zone, or in adjacent villages (Dietrich, 2002). It was illegal to sell diamonds in Kinshasa and in the urban areas of the Kasai provinces, however corrupted officials did allow some trade to exist. De Beers held a monopoly of exports in the DRC, but that changed when DRC strongman Mobutu Sese Seko terminated the De Beers monopoly in 1981 (Dietrich, 2002). This resulted in a liberalization of the diamond sector in 1982, increasing both mining and exports of diamonds in the DRC. In 1982, artisan production was not more than a million carats per annum (Dietrich, 2002). Production increased to six million carats in 1983, and fourteen million carats in 1986 (Dietrich, 2002). Diamond smuggling also occurred where Angolan diamonds were moved across the border to be sold in the DRC (Dietrich, 2002).
Diamond mining in Sierra Leone is undertaken in a unique way. In a report by the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives, artisan miners in Sierra Leone must go through a feudalistic process for mining diamonds (Diamonds and Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone: Proposal for Implementation of a New Diamond Policy and Operations, 2000). This process starts where land is communally owned in Sierra Leone. Artisan miners apply for “leases,” which are managed and rents collected by traditional paramount chiefs. These diggers obtained permission to dig in areas specified by the chiefs, with a requirement to pay a land use fee to the chiefs. Diggers financed their land use fees by “dealers,” who advanced them food, tools and basic household goods, which are then deducted from the proceeds of the sales of the stones the diggers turned over to the dealers. The USAID report claimed, “over time, poverty has conspired with ignorance to create a system of virtual servitude,” (Diamonds and Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone: Proposal for Implementation of a New Diamond Policy and Operations, 2000). Artisan mining requires very little capital, knowledge or technology, but it is labor-intensive. Moreover, any absence of a state regulatory framework allows for this type of mining to be conducted easily and illegally (Goreux, 2001). The combination of small-scale mining, rudimentary technology, and lack of state controls, provides a powerful incentive for rebel organizations to exploit these alluvial diamond deposits for their own profit.
Once the diamonds are dug up from the ground, they are usually sold to local diamond traders, who combined them with diamond purchases from other regions. These diamonds are then sent directly to major trading centers of Antwerp, Tel Aviv, New York, or Bombay where traders and manufacturers selected diamonds for cutting, polishing and setting into retail jewelry for the consumer market (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification and Control of Diamonds, 2000). It is in this phase, where the smuggling becomes murky. According to United Nation’s Canadian ambassador Robert Fowler, the Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) obtained it rough diamonds from alluvial mining areas, which it controlled in Angola. UNITA prepared parcels of diamonds (valued at between $4 million to $5 million each), and then seek out arms brokers who would accept the parcels as payment in exchange for weapons or cash. When diamonds are exchanged for weapons, UNITA prepared parcels of diamonds, and then diamond experts, provided by both the arms broker and UNITA, agreed on the value of each parcel, depending on the number and quality of stones presented (Fowler, 2000). The diamonds are then accepted as payment for weapons. If the deal is non-arms related, where cash is needed, the diamonds are carried to a safe destination outside of Angola, a meeting is arranged with buyers, and the diamonds are exchanged for cash (Fowler, 2000). UNITA representatives have been able to smuggle diamonds to Burkina Faso, Namibia, South Africa, Zaire, and Rwanda under the protection of those state’s governments, where the transactions with buyers are made (Fowler, 2000). UNITA’s key success has been its ability to use diamonds as a means to influence friends in other state governments. By paying off officials in its neighboring countries, UNITA maintained an extensive external support network. Fowler cited several examples of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi using diamonds to buy the friendships of former President of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko, President Eyadema of Togo, and President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso (Fowler 2000). In one example, Savimbi gave two passport-sized packets of diamonds to Togo’s President Eyadema in exchange for allowing Savimbi’s children to come to Togo for their education (Fowler 2000).
In Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) mined alluvial diamonds from the Kono District and Tongo Field. These are two of the most valuable diamond areas in Sierra Leone. Some diamonds from the Tongo Field are traded in Kenema, Sierra Leone, which is located only 28 miles away from Tongo Field (Ayafor, Bodian, Peleman, Sandhu, and Smillie, 2000). These diamonds are exchanged for food and other supplies. It is interesting to note that Ayafor reported, “the continued presence in Kenema of more than 40 separate diamond dealers, many of them Lebanese, even though their main source of supply has officially been out of reach for several years. It is possible that these diamonds could enter the official export system if there is a lack of probity and vigilance in the Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO), the Ministry of Mineral Resources and its branches,” (2000). However, the bulk of the RUF diamonds are smuggled out of Sierra Leone through Liberia (Ayafor et al, 2000). The diamonds are carried by RUF commanders and trusted Liberian couriers to Foya-Kama or Voinjama, and then sent to the capitol Monrovia (Ayafor et al, 2000). The RUF organization also used diamonds as a means to buy outside friendships. Yet, RUF has not had the kind of success in buying outside friendships and influence as UNITA has. There are numerous examples of friction in the sales and transfers of RUF diamonds. In 1998, Captain Michael Comber of the RUF Mining Unit brought a parcel of diamonds from Kono to RUF headquarters in Buedu. These diamonds were given to RUF leader Issa Sesay, who was to travel to Liberia to make arrangements to purchase military equipment with the diamonds. “Sesay lost the diamonds somewhere in Liberia, claiming he had accidentally dropped the parcel in the mud,” (Ayafor, et al, 2000). Ayafor (2000) claimed that RUF couriers often traveled in fear of being robbed by rogue Liberian National Patriotic Front of Liberia fighters (NPFL). “At RUF headquarters in Buedu,” Ayafor said, “Concerns have occasionally arisen that diamonds said to be held in safekeeping by (Liberian) President (Charles) Taylor might have actually have been sold. On one occasion in 1998, (RUF Chief of Defence Staff) Sam Bockarie went to Monrovia to see Taylor about this concern, and when he returned, he reported that he had seen the diamonds,” (2000). There were also rumors of diamond embezzlement by several top RUF leaders (Ayafor, et al 2000). In 1999, Sam Bockarie, who in 1997 was then a RUF ‘Battle Group Commander,’ complained to Chairman of RUF Foday Sankoh that in 1997, a RUF ‘Battle Group Commander Dennis Mingo had sold a diamond to a Lebanese businessman. A portion of the proceeds were to have gone to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council in Sierra Leone, while Le 9 million was to be given to RUF. Bockarie claimed that Mingo embezzled the money (Ayafor, et al, 2000). Not to be outdone, Dennis Mingo wrote to Foday Sankoh from Liberia in October 1999, warning Sankoh that Bockarie could not be trusted and that Sankoh’s life was in danger. Mingo claimed that Bockarie was squandering funds from diamond sales and that Bockarie had bought a house in Liberia and in France, (Ayafor et al, 2000). Finally, there is an interesting connection where “Many prominent exporters from Sierra Leone are also exporters of diamonds from the Gambia, a country that produces no diamonds at all,” (Ayafor et al, 2000). Belgium imports of Gambian rough diamonds average over $100 million per annum between 1996 and 1999 (Ayafor et al, 2000).
Mining and smuggling of the diamonds is only one part of the process in examining conflict diamonds. Once the diamonds have been dug up and smuggled out by rebel organizations, they are used as currency to purchase weapons for continued military operations against the African governments. In other words, diamonds have become an alternative source of currency in rebel financing. Fowler cited that UNITA used diamonds in three unique ways. First is UNITA’s ability to sell rough diamonds for cash or weapons. Second is that diamonds are used by UNITA to buy friendships or maintain external support. Finally, rough diamonds are used as a means of stockpiling wealth for UNITA (Fowler, 2000). Because of their small size, high value, easy marketability, indestructibility and the general availability to UNITA, diamond stocks are preferred for operational needs rather than utilizing cash or bank accounts (Fowler, 2000). The physical demands of storing, transporting, and protecting large sums of cash—perhaps hundreds of millions of dollars worth—is unwieldy to a rebel organization which requires mobility for conducting operations (Fowler, 2000). Fowler also cited that “There is also ample evidence regarding Savimbi’s clear reluctance to deposit UNITA funds in banks, following the imposition of international financial sanctions against UNITA in 1998,” (2000). Over a 6-year period during the 1990s, UNITA was estimated to have generated $3.7 billion in sales of smuggled diamonds (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for Identification, Certification, and Control, 2000). The success of UNITA’s smuggling and financing operations has caused other revolutionary movements to institute their own diamond smuggling business. In Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) has mined an estimated $25 to $125 million in diamonds per annum (Ayafor, Bodian, Peleman, Sandhu, and Smillie, 2000).
The link between conflict diamonds and weapons begins in 1992, when UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi started to build a vast smuggling network to sell the alluvial diamonds from the territory that UNITA had controlled in its brush war with the Angolan government (Soggott, 2002). The Angolan civil war had started in 1975, when the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) had seized power in Angola with strong military backing from the Soviet Union and Cuba (Hawthorne, 2000). MPLA’s main political rival, UNITA, immediately began a guerrilla war against the Luanda government. UNITA received its own military aid from the United States and South Africa (Hawthorne, 2000). In short, Angola became another Cold War conflict between the superpowers in the 1970s and 80s. When the Cold War ended, UNITA’s source of military financing dried up, and Savimbi had to develop a new source of financing for his organization. By 1993, Savimbi was selling diamonds to a South African company De Decker Diamonds, which then turned around and sold the diamonds to De Beers (Soggott, 2002). Robert Fowler had documented the relationship between UNITA and De Decker Diamonds. Fowler learned that from 1993 to 1994, a South African arms dealer named Ronnie De Decker procured much of UNITA’s military equipment. This relationship between Ronnie De Decker and UNITA is based of two components. The first is that Ronnie De Decker could provide weapons to UNITA. The second part is the payment of the weapons with diamonds. While Ronnie De Decker could procure the weapons, his brother Joe De Decker operated De Decker Diamonds in South Africa. More importantly, Joe De Decker was at one time a De Beers site holder, who would purchase supplies rough diamonds for De Beers for cutting and polishing (Fowler, 2000). The weapons that Ronnie De Decker sold to UNITA mainly came from Eastern Europe and included mortar bombs, anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft weapons, grenades, various types of ammunition, and a number of small arms and light weapons (Fowler, 2000). UNITA also utilized Zaire both as a base for stockpiling weapons, and purchasing weapons with Zairian end-user certificates. End-user certificates provided a legal means by which arms brokers, working for UNITA, could obtain the weapons. Zaire’s President Mobutu “Provided Savimbi with the Zairian end-user certificates, and in exchange, Savimbi gave Mobutu diamonds and cash. Savimbi passed the end-user certificates to Marcelo Moises Dachala (known as “Karrica”) who served as UNITA’s representative in Zaire. Karrica in turn would provide the end-user certificates to (Lebanese arms merchant Imad) Kabir, who then used the certificates to purchase the weapons that UNITA required. Weapons came into Kinshasa or Gbadolite directly from their country of origin, often on aircraft owned by a South African national of Belgian origin named Jacques “Kiki” Lemaire,” (Fowler, 2000). Fowler also cited an arrangement between UNITA and Rwanda where Savimbi provided UNITA anti-aircraft crews (SAM 16) to aid Rwandan backed rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Rwanda responded by allowing UNITA to operate freely in Kigali in arranging diamond sales and meetings with arms dealers, with some dealers also supplying Rwanda with weapons (Fowler, 2000). Another connection included Togo. Savimbi wanted to have Togo play a more active role in supporting UNITA. As a token of appreciation, Savimbi gave Togo’s President Eyadema a “passport sized” packet of diamonds in 1993. A working relationship was developed between UNITA and Togo where Togo would keep about 20% share of arms and military equipment that was imported for UNITA, with Eyadema deciding in each case whether Togo would take its share in the equipment, or in cash (Fowler, 2000). At this moment, there are no accurate statistics on how much UNITA has spent in weapons procurement.
In Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front initiated its war against the state in 1991. RUF diamond mining was done on a sporadic and individual basis until 1995, when RUF took control of the diamond fields in the Kono District. When RUF chairman Foday Sankoh was imprisoned in Nigeria in 1997, the diamond areas of Kono and Tongo fields became a primary military focus for RUF, (Ayafor et al, 2000). The link between diamonds and weapons was not as clearly established with RUF as it was with UNITA. However, there was a connection where RUF smuggled diamonds to Liberia, and in exchange, Liberia purchased weapons abroad, then shipped them by air into the country. The weapons were then either delivered by helicopter, flown from Liberian bases to RUF bases, or they were delivered to RUF via truck (Ayafor et al, 2000). This connection was developed through a personal relationship between Liberian President Charles Taylor and RUF chairman Foday Sankoh. This relationship between Taylor and Sankoh was cemented with three specific events. The first was that both men were involved in training activities in Libya around 1990. The second event was that Taylor and Sankoh combined their efforts to allow Blaise Campaore to seize power in Burkina Faso. Finally Sankoh provided assistance in Taylor’s struggle as head of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia to take power in Liberia in the early 1990s (Ayafor et al, 2000). In fact, President Taylor told the United Nations Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone Diamonds and Arms that he was a close friend of Foday Sankoh. However, Taylor denied that he or his government had provided any “training to RUF, any weapons or related material, any Liberian facilities or territory for staging attacks, or a safe haven,” (Ayafor et al, 2000).
The general link in trading diamonds for weapons between Liberia and RUF are centered on the relationships between President Taylor and and RUF chairman Sankoh. But the details that specify how the weapons were actually traded revolved around the relationships between Taylor and his friends and business associates. Fred Rindel, a retired South African Defense Force officer and a former Defense Attaché to the United States, was contracted as a security consultant by Taylor in September 1998. Rindel’s job was to convert Taylor’s former rebel militia into a professional anti-terrorism unit, comprised of Liberian soldiers, and foreigners from Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Gambia, (Ayafor et al, 2000). But Rindel was also the owner of Dodson Aviation Maintenance and Spare Parts, which had flown weapons to Robertsfield, Liberia, in September of 1998 (Ayafor et al, 2000). Robertsfield was one of the airports where weapons were flown into Liberia, then shipped to RUF transfer points. When Dodson Aviation was closed down in December 1998, several of its aircraft were then leased and operated by a company named Greater Holdings, located in Liberia. Greater Holdings had gold and diamond concessions in Liberia (Ayafor, et al, 2000). Rindel was also involved in a diamond project with the son of President Taylor, Charles Taylor Jr. Rindel had included references to De Decker Diamonds on his business card (Ayafor et al, 2000). As noted above, De Decker Diamonds was involved in exchanging diamonds for weapons with UNITA. Rindel was also contracted as a consultant for a mineral and geological survey, for which he acquired gold and mineral rights for two concessions in the Mano and Nimba areas of Liberia for a company called Bermuda Holding Corporation, of which President Charles Taylor held some interests in (Ayafor et al, 2000). Another relationship between Taylor and RUF is a wealthy Lebanese businessman named Talal El-Ndine. El-Ndine was Charles Taylor’s paymaster. He personally paid Liberian couriers who brought RUF diamonds out of Sierra Leone. Arms brokers and shippers negotiated their payments to his office in Monrovia. He coordinated with foreign businessmen and investors who wished to cooperate with the Taylor government in legitimate and illegitimate business dealings. Finally, El-Ndine paid the pilots and crews of aircraft used in clandestine shipments in or out of Liberia (Ayafor et al, 2000). Another close confidant to Charles Taylor was an Israeli businessman named Leonid Minin. Minin had a history of involvement in criminal activities, including trafficking stolen works of art, East European organized crime, arms trafficking and money laundering (Ayafor et al, 2000). Minin owned and operated a BAC-111 aircraft, which had been involved in shipping 68 tons of weapons from the Ukraine to Burkina Faso, and then sent to Liberia (Ayafor et al, 2000). Inventories of these weapons included 715 boxes of weapons and cartridges, 408 boxes of cartridge powder, anti-tank weapons, surface-to-air missiles, and rocket-propelled grenades and their launchers (Ayafor et al, 2000). A manager of a hotel where arms trafficking pilots stayed, named Gus Van Kouwenhoven, was responsible for the logistical aspects of the arms deal. Van Kouwenhoven had an interest in a Malaysian timber project in Liberia, which allowed him to organize the transfer of weapons from Monrovia and into Sierra Leone. Roads built for timber extraction were also used for weapons shipment. Van Kouwenhoven was also a close confident to Charles Taylor (Ayafor et al, 2000). Emmanuel Shaw was the former Liberian finance minister, and owned a number of facilities at Robertsfield, including all the hangers (Ayafor et al, 2000). An Israeli businessman named Simon Rosenblum was also close to President Taylor. Rosenblum had logging and road construction interests in Liberia, and his trucks had been used to carry weapons from Robertsfield to the Sierra Leone border (Ayafor et al, 2000).
The link of trading guns and diamonds between Liberia and Sierra Leone started with the personal relationship between Liberian President Charles Taylor and RUF chairman Foday Sankoh. But Taylor did not get personally involved with helping his friend Sankoh. Instead, he looked the other way, while his closest advisors and friends established the logistical connections within the smuggling business. This provided Taylor with the best of both worlds--denying that, as head of the Liberian government, the country is not involved in aiding RUF, while at the same time providing an environment where his close friends could profit in providing military aid to Sankoh and RUF. It is estimated that Liberian President Charles Taylor had made “more than $400 million per year from the war in the years between 1992 and 1996,” (Berdal and Malone, pg. 5). While most of this $400 million may not have been made specifically through diamond smuggling with Sierra Leone, it does show that Charles Taylor may have used Liberia to benefit in his own economic self-interest. And diamond smuggling was certainly within Charles Taylor’s economic self-interest.
One interesting link that had been uncovered was the possibility that Charles Taylor may have hosted Al-Qaida operatives in his country for the purpose of allowing Al-Qaida to sell diamonds for weapons. Farah reported that Charles Taylor received a $1 million payment for hosting Al-Qaida operatives in his country for at least two months after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, (Farah, 2002). A year long European investigation of Al-Qaida’s financing had uncovered three individuals who may have been conduits to Al-Qaida: Aziz Nassour, a Lebanese diamond merchant, his cousin Samih Osailly, and a Senegalese mercenary Ibrahim Bah, who has also trafficked in guns and diamonds (Farah, 2002). Belgian investigators reported that a small diamond importing company, believed to be owned by Osailly, enjoyed a sudden surge of business and turned over $1 billion a year before Sept. 11, (Farah, 2002). Belgian investigators also noted that $20 million was withdrawn from an ASA Diam account at Artesia bank, which may have been used in purchasing diamonds (Farah, 2002). Investigators believed that Al-Qaida was moving its assets out of the banking system and into commodities. European and U.S. officials had also found evidence that Nassour and Osailly were trying to buy surface-to-air missiles from the Nicaraguan army and a Bulgarian company, (Farah, 2002). Farah reported that Al-Qaida operatives “moved between a protected area in Liberia and the presidential compound in neighboring Burkina Faso,” (2002). Charles Taylor and Burkina Faso President Blaise Campaore both denied the charges, (Farah, 2002).
So why are diamonds so attractive for smuggling? Both Fowler and Goreux noted that diamond’s small size, high value and ease of transport made them attractive to smuggle. The artisanal mining process of alluvial diamonds by UNITA and RUF provided a cheap, easy and steady supply of resources, so as long as the rebels could maintain control of the territory that contained the alluvial deposits. Once government forces took control of the deposits away from UNITA and RUF, the financing for their military operations was also removed. So it was in UNITA’s and RUF’s economic self-interest to exploit the diamonds for as long as they can since they would reap all the benefits in selling the diamonds, while they bore almost no costs associated with the smuggling of diamonds. Michael Ross reported a strong association between civil wars and diamonds—specifically alluvial diamonds (2005). He cited a number of factors to base this association. First is the resources ‘lootability,’ or ease at which the resource can be extracted and transported by individuals or small teams. Conflict diamonds are easily extracted by rebel organizations. Oil, gas, and kimberlite diamonds are not lootable. A resource is ‘obstructable’ if its transportation can be easily blocked by small numbers of individuals or groups with few weapons. Ross said that resources with a high value-to-weight ratio, such as diamonds, can be transported by air and thus are difficult to obstruct. Whereas, resources with a low value-to-weight ratio--such as oil--are easily obstructable (Ross, 2005). Ross also stated that the more lootable a resource is, the more likely the resource will benefit a rebel group. The more unlootable a resource is, the more likely it will benefit the government (2005). He finds it especially notable that Angola has both lootable and unlootable resources, where the government has continuously controlled the unlootable resources of oil while the rebels have gained some control of the lootable resources of diamonds (Ross, 2005). Michael Ross also noted that the more lootable the resource is, the more likely it is to prolong the conflict. He claimed that when the lootable resources flows to the rebels, they are more likely to prolong a conflict since the rebels are typically the weaker party. Without the funding from lootable resources, the rebels would be forced to negotiate a settlement, or be extinguished (Ross, 2005). In the Angolan conflict with UNITA, the civil war at first became a superpower conflict where the government was supported by the Soviet Union, and UNITA was supported by the United States. After the Cold War winded down, the superpower conflict was diminished—as was UNITA’s funding. Conflict diamonds provided a new means to the support for UNITAs operations at the end of the Cold War.
But the issue of conflict diamonds requires more than just the supply of diamonds. It also requires a market demand for those diamonds. As Cook had stated, $7.885 billion of rough diamonds were produced in 2001 (2003). In 2000, a total of $9 billion of rough diamonds had come to the global market, which $5.67 billion were sold by De Beers (Cook, 2003). Goreux reported that in 1999, a total of $7.3 million in rough diamonds were purchased globally, which translated into a worldwide consumption of $56 billion in diamond jewelry (2001). Goreux continues by estimating that 41 percent of the world diamond production valued at the mines, originates from Botswana, South Africa, and Namibia, of which De Beers plays the dominant force (2001). A further 33% of diamond production comes from Russia, Australia, and Canada (Goreux, 2001). These six countries constituted 74 percent of world production (Goreux, 2001). Much of the mining done in these countries utilizes the kimberlitic process (Goreux, 2001). The remaining 26% of world production comes from ten countries in western and central Africa, and a few countries in Asia and Latin America (Goreux). It is these countries that utilize the alluvial mining process (Goreux, 2001). The sheer size and volume of the world diamond market provides an incredible incentive for those individuals and organizations to exploit whatever diamond mining they can in conflicted regions. A second problem with the diamond market is the failure of industry self-regulation. A diamond expert can generally examine a particular stone, and identify its country of origin. The problem arises where diamonds from different geographic regions are mixed together, and then imported into Belgium, classified as mixed goods. This renders the identification of diamonds impossible, since a particular parcel may contain stones from Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, or even Liberia (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification, and Control of Diamonds, 2000). Even more confusing is an example where some Russian stones are exported to Liberia, and then classified as Liberian diamonds when sent to Belgium. This is done to avoid a 0.3 percent import tax on Russian diamonds when entering Belgium (Goreux, 2001). Diamonds mixed from various countries have a greater chance of containing conflict diamonds. Diamonds that are extracted specifically from De Beers’s mines, Canada, Russia, or Australia have not had this problem of mixing with conflict diamonds (Goreux, 2001). Another problem is simply the number of people employed in the diamond industry worldwide. In Belgium, there are over 1,500 companies employing approximately 60 De Beers’s sightholders (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification, and Control of Diamonds, 2000). In 1998, the total workforce in Belgium was estimated to be at 3,000 (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, 2001). Israel employs around 2,000-4,000 in the diamond industry, exporting more than $4.2 billion to the United States. This equates to approximately 46.5% of U.S. import market (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, 2000). Thailand employs nearly 5,000 in the diamond industry, with three De Beers’s sightholders, and is ranked as the world’s ninth largest diamond exporter (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, 2000). The United States employs 1,800 licensed dealers with 25 De Beers’s sightholders, with 100 manufacturers employing about 600 cutters (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, 2000). Finally, India dominates the polished diamond market with exports worth $6 billion and about 50% by value of the world market share of polished diamonds. Indian diamond industry provides 700,000 jobs—with 95% of all employed in cutting diamonds working in India (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification and Control of Diamonds, 2000). With this large number of people employed in multiple countries, and each country developing its own trade, import and export regulations, it becomes almost impossible for the industry to track the source of conflict diamonds—especially if the conflict diamonds are mixed together with other stones in Africa. Because of the extensive trading in diamonds by UNITA and RUF, the United Nations imposed sanctions on diamond trading with UNITA in 1998, then later expanded the sanctions to Liberia and RUF-controlled territories in Sierra Leone (Soggot, 2002).
In 2002, South Africa launched the Kimberly Process. This process was to provide an international framework, which would identify and record the origin of the world’s diamonds under the supervision of the diamond industry’s World Diamond Council (Soggot, 2002). In effect, the diamond industry would police itself in trafficking conflict diamonds by issuing certificates of origin to parcels, which would identified where the stones came from. Yet Goreux reported that in Angola, “a certificate of origin could be bought for five dollars and that UNITA soldiers routinely traded stones with government soldiers. A parcel purchased from the Ministry of Mines could, therefore, be contaminated with conflict diamonds,” (2001). Another flaw of the Kimberly Process was that different nations would have different regulations concerning the importation and exportation of diamonds. In Belgium, customs officials and diamond experts open and inspect each parcel of diamonds entering or leaving Belgium under the supervision of an officer of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. However in India, diamonds are imported, duty-free and no certificates of origin are required (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for Identification, Certification, and Control of Diamonds, 2000). Israel requires that standard documentation should accompany imports of diamonds, with the exception of Angola where a certificate of origin is required. All imported diamond shipments into Israel are also opened and inspected by diamond evaluators. Yet in the United States, imported diamonds are free of duty, and no special documentation or procedures are required. Diamond imports into the United States are regulated according to basic Customs procedures (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification, and Control of Diamonds, 2000). Soggot reported that the General Accounting Office criticized the Kimberly Process as being ‘inherently flawed,” (2002). The GAO said that, “The period after rough diamonds enter the first foreign port until the final point of sale is covered by a system of voluntary industry participation and self-regulated monitoring and enforcement,” (Soggot, 2002). With certificates being forged, and countries developing their own import/export regulations on diamonds, problems where conflict diamonds can easily enter the market will still continue to haunt the Kimberly Process.
The civil wars in Angola, Sierra Leone, and Liberia have quickly winded down to an end. On February 22, 2002, government forces killed UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in a firefight in Angola (An End to Angola’s 27 Years of War, 2002). Savimbi’s death had taken the fight out of UNITA. By March 31, both the Angolan government and UNITA had signed a cease-fire agreement to halt the civil war. By November, 2002, both sides had developed agreements to convert UNITA into a political opposition party in Angolan politics, and to promote reconciliation and reconstruction of the country (Former Angolan Rebel Group Offers to Back Government, 2002). The Angolan civil war has killed an estimated 500,000 people, and has displaced millions of Angolans (An End to Angola’s 27 Years of War, 2002). In Sierra Leone, President Kabbah, who was elected in 1996 and then deposed by a military junta, was reinstated to his post after the intervention of Nigerian ECOMOG forces in 1998 (Polity IV Country Report: Sierra Leone, 2005). In 1999, the United Nations sent 12,000 peacekeepers to the country. Near the end of 2000, RUF had disintegrated after the capture of Foday Sankoh (Polity IV Country Report 2003: Sierra Leone, 2005). The combination of increasing government military successes against the rebels and the UN peacekeeping forces had forced disarmament of RUF-controlled regions. By the end of 2001, much of Sierra Leone was under government control (Polity IV Country Report 2003: Sierra Leone). Foday Sankoh died in prison of natural causes on July 29, 2003 (Foday Sankoh, Sierra Leone Rebel Leader, Dies. 2003). In Liberia, ever since Charles Taylor gained power from his own civil war in 1997, two major opposition groups had been attempting to oust Taylor from power. These two opposition groups were the Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), (Liberia – Second Civil War – 1997-2003, 2000-2005). LURD and MODEL had controlled from 60-80 percent of the country when they initiated the war against Taylor (Liberia – Second Civil War – 1997-2003, 2000-2005). The situation in Liberia deteriorated until from February 8 to September 14, 2002, Taylor imposed a state of emergency on the country. After continuing to deny Liberia’s involvement in Sierra Leone, Taylor finally admitted that his government had aided and supported RUF in their civil war in Sierra Leone on November 12, 2002, (Gongloe, 2002). By June 2003, LURD and MODEL forces had cut off Liberia’s capital Monrovia. The United Nations indicted Taylor for war crimes and issued an international warrant for his arrest on June 4, 2003. On July 6, 2003, President Charles Taylor stepped down from office and accepted asylum to Nigeria (Gongloe, 2002). In 2002, the United Nations lifted the ban on selling diamonds in Angola (Angola’s Former Rebels Glad to See UN Sanctions Lifted, 2002).
While the civil wars have ended, the smuggling of conflict diamonds still exists. The networking organizations, the knowledge and contacts still remain. UNITA and RUF leaders have transferred their positions of power in a rebel organization to positions of power as political party members, or positions in government. Instead of smuggling diamonds for weapons, former rebel leaders can smuggle diamonds to enrich themselves or to use diamonds to buy friendships and contacts within the government. Within the alluvial mines, the artisan mining process still exists in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo where people work for sub-standard wages. The guy with the gun still gets the diamonds. The governments of Angola or DRC must utilize better trained, equipped and better paid soldiers to maintain control of the alluvial mines and stop any forms of corruption. If the governments cannot control the mines, then they must develop a business relationship with the large mining companies to mine the alluvial diamonds. The mining companies have the knowledge, resources, and the economies of scale to secure, control and extract the diamonds in an efficient manner. They can readily hire the artisan miners to mine the diamonds for wages, and perhaps even for a percentage of profit from the diamonds they extract. And the government can also receive a steady income from the diamonds mined from taxes—the current artisan mining does not allow the government to collect revenue from taxation of the miners. In Sierra Leone, the feudalistic process still remains, maintaining power of the mining process with the tribal chiefs, who control the land, and the dealers, who control the supplies. Mining companies contracted to mine the deposits would neutralize the power of the dealers and chiefs, mining the diamonds in an efficient manner while paying the miners wages for their labors. This would also eliminate the continued accumulation of debt of the artisan miners to the dealers, while wages would allow the artisan miners to pay down their debts. If market pricing and knowledge could be brought efficiently into the African countries, then any diamonds the artisan miners could gain from their own labors would be sold to the best possible prices that the artisan miners could seek out, rather than simply giving all the diamonds to the dealers to sell on their behalf. Another problem is that the borders between the African countries are still porous, allowing for the ease of transferring diamonds between countries, and moving the diamonds out to the world market. Even the Kimberly process of controlling conflict diamonds is flawed. Industry self-regulation allows those who operate outside of the industry to profit with impunity. There are no sanctions, or intra-government enforcement in regulating the trade of diamonds or punishing individuals, companies or governments who break the international laws with impunity. Diamond traders in Africa can still mix conflict stones with other stones from South Africa or Botswana, and then sell them to the Indian market where no certificates are required. With today’s advances in desktop publishing and printing, certificates can still easily be forged, allowing the diamonds to move to the different trading centers. Allowing mining companies to mine the alluvial diamonds would provide the control of transferring the diamonds to the market in a legal manner. The diamond industry must also work with governments, law enforcement agencies, and possibly the United Nations to address the flaws of the Kimberly process and develop new regulations to reduce the amount of smuggling, or to channel the smuggling efforts to an improved legal market specifically designed for the conflict diamonds, where traders who wish to specifically buy conflict diamonds may choose to do so in this market. Another alternative may be to scrap the Kimberly process and allow the entire market to decide whether to buy and sell conflict diamonds according to the demands of the market.
For almost 30 years, the civil wars have raged through the African nations, killing and displacing millions of people. The Cold War processes of the United States aiding one faction, and the Soviet Union aiding the other funded much of these wars. It was at the end of the Cold War, where the power and wealth of diamonds became available as the means for financing these wars by rebel organizations. Yet the story of the conflict diamonds simply doesn’t end there. For conflict diamonds also tells the stories of who the leaders were both in the rebel organizations of UNITA’s Jonas Savimbi, and RUF’s Foday Sankoh, and of the governments of Liberia’s Charles Taylor, Togo’s Eyadema, and Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Campaore. It was the personal relationships between these leaders and conflict diamonds were the glue to hold these relationships together. It is ironic that once Savimbi, Sankoh, and Taylor were removed from their positions of power within their organizations that the civil wars and conflict diamonds have died out. Yet positions of power in governments still remain in Africa. Diamonds are still mined in the alluvial plains. It is only a matter of time when the glitter of diamonds wealth and power will cement new relationships with Africa’s new leaders. Hopefully the cement of these new relationships will not be stained red with the “blood diamonds” of conflict.
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International Economics
Economics Research Paper: Conflict Diamonds
Diamonds. One of the hardest substances known to man, a diamond is basically carbon compressed to a crystalline form. It glitters and sparkles in a dazzling brilliance. It is the oldest and most precious of all minerals. A diamond now signifies a never-ending love and commitment between newlyweds, starting with a gift of an engagement ring, and culminating to the 75th wedding anniversary diamond. To quote a famous song line, “Diamonds are a girl’s best friend.”
But there is a darker side to a diamond’s sparkle. It is a side of death, of war, of smuggled profits and riches to few, and economic poverty and misery to many. These are the conflict or “blood” diamonds. Conflict diamonds are rough diamonds mined and smuggled out of the African states of Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo by rebel organizations, which then utilize the proceeds from the sales of these smuggled diamonds to finance their military operations against the legitimate African governments of these states. This paper is divided into three parts. The first part defines how conflict diamonds are mined and smuggled out of Africa. The second part examines the link between conflict diamonds and weapons purchases. Finally, there is an analysis of conflict diamonds and how to reduce their presence in the world markets.
Conflict diamonds comprised an estimated 3.7% to 15% of the value of global diamond trade in 2000 (Cook, 2003). In 2001, the production of rough diamonds was estimated to be around $7.885 billion, with the United States importing $597.38 million of rough diamonds in 2001 (Cook, 2003). Cook estimated the total value of worked, but uncounted diamonds imported into the United States to be even larger than that of rough diamonds at $10.06 billion in 2001. Goreux stated that rough diamonds purchased at the mine gates in 1999 were valued at $7.3 billion (2001). Diamonds sorted, polished and then sold to jewelers were valued at $14 billion. When jewelers add gold, platinum, and precious stones other than diamonds, this increases the costs by another $14 billion, bringing total production costs to $28 billion. Add a 100 percent retail profit margin, and Goreux estimated the value paid by consumers of diamond jewelry to be around $56 billion worldwide (Goreux, 2001). This increasingly stream of revenue in the diamond market provides a powerful incentive for individuals to profit in the sales of conflict diamonds.
Before any analysis of conflict diamonds can start, a few words must be said about De Beers Corporation. De Beers is the dominant force within the diamond industry. For almost 70 years, De Beers has created a diamond cartel by carefully maintaining the pricing and supply of diamonds in the world market. It has achieved this cartel by owning over 40 percent of the diamond mines and a large buffer-stock of unpolished diamonds, almost to the equivalent to a full year of world production in 1998 (Goreux, 2000). However, new supplies of diamonds have been discovered in Canada and Australia. This increase in supply has threatened De Beer’s control of world prices. The company has released its control of world prices and has reduced its buffer stock from $5 billion in 1998 to less than $3 billion in 2000 (Goreux, 2000). De Beers originally started its successful “A diamond is forever” marketing campaign, but as both new independent suppliers took advantage of the free De Beers advertising, and as the issue of conflict diamonds received greater public awareness, De Beers adapted it strategy. De Beers stopped buying diamonds on the open market in Africa and in Antwerp—the world’s diamond trading capital—and instead relied on the supply in its own mines and in joint ventures with local producers (Soggot, 2002). De Beers created a new concept of “branded diamonds,” where diamonds are engraved with De Beers’ brand on special machinery, guaranteeing that the stones are conflict free (Soggot, 2002). This strategy allowed De Beers to project a new image as “the Supplier of choice,” (Goreux, 2000).
Mining diamonds are classified by two processes—kimberlite and alluvial. Kimberlite mining occurs where the diamonds are mined from the volcanic pipes, which push the diamond-rich magma to the surface. Once the diamond material is exposed to weathering and erosion, it is broken apart and carried down through rivers and streams to alluvial, or stream bed, deposits (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification and Control of Diamonds, 2000). What is important to note is that kimberlite mining requires advanced mining technology and capital necessary either to utilize heavy mining machinery to dig down into the volcanic crater to access the exposed kimberlite, or to develop the underground mine shafts in order to tap these diamond-rich volcanic pipes. Such mining can only be done by a national government, or large mining corporations, which must develop economic and business relationships with the current government of the state in order to access the resources within the territory of that state. Rebel organizations involved in a dispute against the state, do not have the knowledge, technology, or skills necessary to capitalize on these resources. However, alluvial diamonds are located on the surface of streams or riverbeds. They can be picked up, or dug up using rudimentary tools such as pick-axes or shovels. Alluvial diamond mining is basically small-scale, or artisan in nature (Goreux, 2001). It is practiced in poor and remote areas by a largely itinerant and poorly educated population with little employment opportunities. Goreux estimated that 13 million people in about 30 countries are small-scale/artisan miners (2001). Mining conditions are harsh, unhealthy, and the artisan miners are poorly paid. There is no health insurance, no legal, labor, or fiscal regulations. Goreux said that a sizable part of the artisan mining population consists of young male workers living in an insecure environment (2001). Artisan mining provides an income for those young males to spend on widely available illicit drugs and the sex trade (Goreux, 2001). Blaine Harden described an account where a digger Miki Galedem, 30, had found a rough stone of nine carats in a Congolese streambed, when he was 16 in 1993 (2000). He was paid $4,800 for the stone, but Galedem wasted the money on “beer and women,” (Harden, 2000). With artisan diamond mining, the rules are that the guy with the gun gets the diamond (Harden, 2000). Harden said of a digger Mati Balemo finding a diamond about the size of a raisin after digging for an hour in the mud. Diamond traders in Kisangani would pay about $20 for the stone. “ ‘I’m very glad,’ Mr. Balemo said, not smiling much. This was the first diamond in nearly a week. ‘It’s not much money for all that work.’ The soldier with the stubby machine gun, who had been watching closely from the riverbank, came over and took the diamond. He folded it into a scrap of paper backed with gold foil and stuffed the packet into his chest pocket,” (Harden, 2000).
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, diamond mining is also undertaken using the artisan mining process. While mining of diamonds could take place in the 1980s, the selling of diamonds was restricted within the mining zone, or in adjacent villages (Dietrich, 2002). It was illegal to sell diamonds in Kinshasa and in the urban areas of the Kasai provinces, however corrupted officials did allow some trade to exist. De Beers held a monopoly of exports in the DRC, but that changed when DRC strongman Mobutu Sese Seko terminated the De Beers monopoly in 1981 (Dietrich, 2002). This resulted in a liberalization of the diamond sector in 1982, increasing both mining and exports of diamonds in the DRC. In 1982, artisan production was not more than a million carats per annum (Dietrich, 2002). Production increased to six million carats in 1983, and fourteen million carats in 1986 (Dietrich, 2002). Diamond smuggling also occurred where Angolan diamonds were moved across the border to be sold in the DRC (Dietrich, 2002).
Diamond mining in Sierra Leone is undertaken in a unique way. In a report by the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives, artisan miners in Sierra Leone must go through a feudalistic process for mining diamonds (Diamonds and Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone: Proposal for Implementation of a New Diamond Policy and Operations, 2000). This process starts where land is communally owned in Sierra Leone. Artisan miners apply for “leases,” which are managed and rents collected by traditional paramount chiefs. These diggers obtained permission to dig in areas specified by the chiefs, with a requirement to pay a land use fee to the chiefs. Diggers financed their land use fees by “dealers,” who advanced them food, tools and basic household goods, which are then deducted from the proceeds of the sales of the stones the diggers turned over to the dealers. The USAID report claimed, “over time, poverty has conspired with ignorance to create a system of virtual servitude,” (Diamonds and Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone: Proposal for Implementation of a New Diamond Policy and Operations, 2000). Artisan mining requires very little capital, knowledge or technology, but it is labor-intensive. Moreover, any absence of a state regulatory framework allows for this type of mining to be conducted easily and illegally (Goreux, 2001). The combination of small-scale mining, rudimentary technology, and lack of state controls, provides a powerful incentive for rebel organizations to exploit these alluvial diamond deposits for their own profit.
Once the diamonds are dug up from the ground, they are usually sold to local diamond traders, who combined them with diamond purchases from other regions. These diamonds are then sent directly to major trading centers of Antwerp, Tel Aviv, New York, or Bombay where traders and manufacturers selected diamonds for cutting, polishing and setting into retail jewelry for the consumer market (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification and Control of Diamonds, 2000). It is in this phase, where the smuggling becomes murky. According to United Nation’s Canadian ambassador Robert Fowler, the Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA) obtained it rough diamonds from alluvial mining areas, which it controlled in Angola. UNITA prepared parcels of diamonds (valued at between $4 million to $5 million each), and then seek out arms brokers who would accept the parcels as payment in exchange for weapons or cash. When diamonds are exchanged for weapons, UNITA prepared parcels of diamonds, and then diamond experts, provided by both the arms broker and UNITA, agreed on the value of each parcel, depending on the number and quality of stones presented (Fowler, 2000). The diamonds are then accepted as payment for weapons. If the deal is non-arms related, where cash is needed, the diamonds are carried to a safe destination outside of Angola, a meeting is arranged with buyers, and the diamonds are exchanged for cash (Fowler, 2000). UNITA representatives have been able to smuggle diamonds to Burkina Faso, Namibia, South Africa, Zaire, and Rwanda under the protection of those state’s governments, where the transactions with buyers are made (Fowler, 2000). UNITA’s key success has been its ability to use diamonds as a means to influence friends in other state governments. By paying off officials in its neighboring countries, UNITA maintained an extensive external support network. Fowler cited several examples of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi using diamonds to buy the friendships of former President of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko, President Eyadema of Togo, and President Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso (Fowler 2000). In one example, Savimbi gave two passport-sized packets of diamonds to Togo’s President Eyadema in exchange for allowing Savimbi’s children to come to Togo for their education (Fowler 2000).
In Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) mined alluvial diamonds from the Kono District and Tongo Field. These are two of the most valuable diamond areas in Sierra Leone. Some diamonds from the Tongo Field are traded in Kenema, Sierra Leone, which is located only 28 miles away from Tongo Field (Ayafor, Bodian, Peleman, Sandhu, and Smillie, 2000). These diamonds are exchanged for food and other supplies. It is interesting to note that Ayafor reported, “the continued presence in Kenema of more than 40 separate diamond dealers, many of them Lebanese, even though their main source of supply has officially been out of reach for several years. It is possible that these diamonds could enter the official export system if there is a lack of probity and vigilance in the Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO), the Ministry of Mineral Resources and its branches,” (2000). However, the bulk of the RUF diamonds are smuggled out of Sierra Leone through Liberia (Ayafor et al, 2000). The diamonds are carried by RUF commanders and trusted Liberian couriers to Foya-Kama or Voinjama, and then sent to the capitol Monrovia (Ayafor et al, 2000). The RUF organization also used diamonds as a means to buy outside friendships. Yet, RUF has not had the kind of success in buying outside friendships and influence as UNITA has. There are numerous examples of friction in the sales and transfers of RUF diamonds. In 1998, Captain Michael Comber of the RUF Mining Unit brought a parcel of diamonds from Kono to RUF headquarters in Buedu. These diamonds were given to RUF leader Issa Sesay, who was to travel to Liberia to make arrangements to purchase military equipment with the diamonds. “Sesay lost the diamonds somewhere in Liberia, claiming he had accidentally dropped the parcel in the mud,” (Ayafor, et al, 2000). Ayafor (2000) claimed that RUF couriers often traveled in fear of being robbed by rogue Liberian National Patriotic Front of Liberia fighters (NPFL). “At RUF headquarters in Buedu,” Ayafor said, “Concerns have occasionally arisen that diamonds said to be held in safekeeping by (Liberian) President (Charles) Taylor might have actually have been sold. On one occasion in 1998, (RUF Chief of Defence Staff) Sam Bockarie went to Monrovia to see Taylor about this concern, and when he returned, he reported that he had seen the diamonds,” (2000). There were also rumors of diamond embezzlement by several top RUF leaders (Ayafor, et al 2000). In 1999, Sam Bockarie, who in 1997 was then a RUF ‘Battle Group Commander,’ complained to Chairman of RUF Foday Sankoh that in 1997, a RUF ‘Battle Group Commander Dennis Mingo had sold a diamond to a Lebanese businessman. A portion of the proceeds were to have gone to the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council in Sierra Leone, while Le 9 million was to be given to RUF. Bockarie claimed that Mingo embezzled the money (Ayafor, et al, 2000). Not to be outdone, Dennis Mingo wrote to Foday Sankoh from Liberia in October 1999, warning Sankoh that Bockarie could not be trusted and that Sankoh’s life was in danger. Mingo claimed that Bockarie was squandering funds from diamond sales and that Bockarie had bought a house in Liberia and in France, (Ayafor et al, 2000). Finally, there is an interesting connection where “Many prominent exporters from Sierra Leone are also exporters of diamonds from the Gambia, a country that produces no diamonds at all,” (Ayafor et al, 2000). Belgium imports of Gambian rough diamonds average over $100 million per annum between 1996 and 1999 (Ayafor et al, 2000).
Mining and smuggling of the diamonds is only one part of the process in examining conflict diamonds. Once the diamonds have been dug up and smuggled out by rebel organizations, they are used as currency to purchase weapons for continued military operations against the African governments. In other words, diamonds have become an alternative source of currency in rebel financing. Fowler cited that UNITA used diamonds in three unique ways. First is UNITA’s ability to sell rough diamonds for cash or weapons. Second is that diamonds are used by UNITA to buy friendships or maintain external support. Finally, rough diamonds are used as a means of stockpiling wealth for UNITA (Fowler, 2000). Because of their small size, high value, easy marketability, indestructibility and the general availability to UNITA, diamond stocks are preferred for operational needs rather than utilizing cash or bank accounts (Fowler, 2000). The physical demands of storing, transporting, and protecting large sums of cash—perhaps hundreds of millions of dollars worth—is unwieldy to a rebel organization which requires mobility for conducting operations (Fowler, 2000). Fowler also cited that “There is also ample evidence regarding Savimbi’s clear reluctance to deposit UNITA funds in banks, following the imposition of international financial sanctions against UNITA in 1998,” (2000). Over a 6-year period during the 1990s, UNITA was estimated to have generated $3.7 billion in sales of smuggled diamonds (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for Identification, Certification, and Control, 2000). The success of UNITA’s smuggling and financing operations has caused other revolutionary movements to institute their own diamond smuggling business. In Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) has mined an estimated $25 to $125 million in diamonds per annum (Ayafor, Bodian, Peleman, Sandhu, and Smillie, 2000).
The link between conflict diamonds and weapons begins in 1992, when UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi started to build a vast smuggling network to sell the alluvial diamonds from the territory that UNITA had controlled in its brush war with the Angolan government (Soggott, 2002). The Angolan civil war had started in 1975, when the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) had seized power in Angola with strong military backing from the Soviet Union and Cuba (Hawthorne, 2000). MPLA’s main political rival, UNITA, immediately began a guerrilla war against the Luanda government. UNITA received its own military aid from the United States and South Africa (Hawthorne, 2000). In short, Angola became another Cold War conflict between the superpowers in the 1970s and 80s. When the Cold War ended, UNITA’s source of military financing dried up, and Savimbi had to develop a new source of financing for his organization. By 1993, Savimbi was selling diamonds to a South African company De Decker Diamonds, which then turned around and sold the diamonds to De Beers (Soggott, 2002). Robert Fowler had documented the relationship between UNITA and De Decker Diamonds. Fowler learned that from 1993 to 1994, a South African arms dealer named Ronnie De Decker procured much of UNITA’s military equipment. This relationship between Ronnie De Decker and UNITA is based of two components. The first is that Ronnie De Decker could provide weapons to UNITA. The second part is the payment of the weapons with diamonds. While Ronnie De Decker could procure the weapons, his brother Joe De Decker operated De Decker Diamonds in South Africa. More importantly, Joe De Decker was at one time a De Beers site holder, who would purchase supplies rough diamonds for De Beers for cutting and polishing (Fowler, 2000). The weapons that Ronnie De Decker sold to UNITA mainly came from Eastern Europe and included mortar bombs, anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft weapons, grenades, various types of ammunition, and a number of small arms and light weapons (Fowler, 2000). UNITA also utilized Zaire both as a base for stockpiling weapons, and purchasing weapons with Zairian end-user certificates. End-user certificates provided a legal means by which arms brokers, working for UNITA, could obtain the weapons. Zaire’s President Mobutu “Provided Savimbi with the Zairian end-user certificates, and in exchange, Savimbi gave Mobutu diamonds and cash. Savimbi passed the end-user certificates to Marcelo Moises Dachala (known as “Karrica”) who served as UNITA’s representative in Zaire. Karrica in turn would provide the end-user certificates to (Lebanese arms merchant Imad) Kabir, who then used the certificates to purchase the weapons that UNITA required. Weapons came into Kinshasa or Gbadolite directly from their country of origin, often on aircraft owned by a South African national of Belgian origin named Jacques “Kiki” Lemaire,” (Fowler, 2000). Fowler also cited an arrangement between UNITA and Rwanda where Savimbi provided UNITA anti-aircraft crews (SAM 16) to aid Rwandan backed rebels in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Rwanda responded by allowing UNITA to operate freely in Kigali in arranging diamond sales and meetings with arms dealers, with some dealers also supplying Rwanda with weapons (Fowler, 2000). Another connection included Togo. Savimbi wanted to have Togo play a more active role in supporting UNITA. As a token of appreciation, Savimbi gave Togo’s President Eyadema a “passport sized” packet of diamonds in 1993. A working relationship was developed between UNITA and Togo where Togo would keep about 20% share of arms and military equipment that was imported for UNITA, with Eyadema deciding in each case whether Togo would take its share in the equipment, or in cash (Fowler, 2000). At this moment, there are no accurate statistics on how much UNITA has spent in weapons procurement.
In Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front initiated its war against the state in 1991. RUF diamond mining was done on a sporadic and individual basis until 1995, when RUF took control of the diamond fields in the Kono District. When RUF chairman Foday Sankoh was imprisoned in Nigeria in 1997, the diamond areas of Kono and Tongo fields became a primary military focus for RUF, (Ayafor et al, 2000). The link between diamonds and weapons was not as clearly established with RUF as it was with UNITA. However, there was a connection where RUF smuggled diamonds to Liberia, and in exchange, Liberia purchased weapons abroad, then shipped them by air into the country. The weapons were then either delivered by helicopter, flown from Liberian bases to RUF bases, or they were delivered to RUF via truck (Ayafor et al, 2000). This connection was developed through a personal relationship between Liberian President Charles Taylor and RUF chairman Foday Sankoh. This relationship between Taylor and Sankoh was cemented with three specific events. The first was that both men were involved in training activities in Libya around 1990. The second event was that Taylor and Sankoh combined their efforts to allow Blaise Campaore to seize power in Burkina Faso. Finally Sankoh provided assistance in Taylor’s struggle as head of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia to take power in Liberia in the early 1990s (Ayafor et al, 2000). In fact, President Taylor told the United Nations Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone Diamonds and Arms that he was a close friend of Foday Sankoh. However, Taylor denied that he or his government had provided any “training to RUF, any weapons or related material, any Liberian facilities or territory for staging attacks, or a safe haven,” (Ayafor et al, 2000).
The general link in trading diamonds for weapons between Liberia and RUF are centered on the relationships between President Taylor and and RUF chairman Sankoh. But the details that specify how the weapons were actually traded revolved around the relationships between Taylor and his friends and business associates. Fred Rindel, a retired South African Defense Force officer and a former Defense Attaché to the United States, was contracted as a security consultant by Taylor in September 1998. Rindel’s job was to convert Taylor’s former rebel militia into a professional anti-terrorism unit, comprised of Liberian soldiers, and foreigners from Sierra Leone, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Gambia, (Ayafor et al, 2000). But Rindel was also the owner of Dodson Aviation Maintenance and Spare Parts, which had flown weapons to Robertsfield, Liberia, in September of 1998 (Ayafor et al, 2000). Robertsfield was one of the airports where weapons were flown into Liberia, then shipped to RUF transfer points. When Dodson Aviation was closed down in December 1998, several of its aircraft were then leased and operated by a company named Greater Holdings, located in Liberia. Greater Holdings had gold and diamond concessions in Liberia (Ayafor, et al, 2000). Rindel was also involved in a diamond project with the son of President Taylor, Charles Taylor Jr. Rindel had included references to De Decker Diamonds on his business card (Ayafor et al, 2000). As noted above, De Decker Diamonds was involved in exchanging diamonds for weapons with UNITA. Rindel was also contracted as a consultant for a mineral and geological survey, for which he acquired gold and mineral rights for two concessions in the Mano and Nimba areas of Liberia for a company called Bermuda Holding Corporation, of which President Charles Taylor held some interests in (Ayafor et al, 2000). Another relationship between Taylor and RUF is a wealthy Lebanese businessman named Talal El-Ndine. El-Ndine was Charles Taylor’s paymaster. He personally paid Liberian couriers who brought RUF diamonds out of Sierra Leone. Arms brokers and shippers negotiated their payments to his office in Monrovia. He coordinated with foreign businessmen and investors who wished to cooperate with the Taylor government in legitimate and illegitimate business dealings. Finally, El-Ndine paid the pilots and crews of aircraft used in clandestine shipments in or out of Liberia (Ayafor et al, 2000). Another close confidant to Charles Taylor was an Israeli businessman named Leonid Minin. Minin had a history of involvement in criminal activities, including trafficking stolen works of art, East European organized crime, arms trafficking and money laundering (Ayafor et al, 2000). Minin owned and operated a BAC-111 aircraft, which had been involved in shipping 68 tons of weapons from the Ukraine to Burkina Faso, and then sent to Liberia (Ayafor et al, 2000). Inventories of these weapons included 715 boxes of weapons and cartridges, 408 boxes of cartridge powder, anti-tank weapons, surface-to-air missiles, and rocket-propelled grenades and their launchers (Ayafor et al, 2000). A manager of a hotel where arms trafficking pilots stayed, named Gus Van Kouwenhoven, was responsible for the logistical aspects of the arms deal. Van Kouwenhoven had an interest in a Malaysian timber project in Liberia, which allowed him to organize the transfer of weapons from Monrovia and into Sierra Leone. Roads built for timber extraction were also used for weapons shipment. Van Kouwenhoven was also a close confident to Charles Taylor (Ayafor et al, 2000). Emmanuel Shaw was the former Liberian finance minister, and owned a number of facilities at Robertsfield, including all the hangers (Ayafor et al, 2000). An Israeli businessman named Simon Rosenblum was also close to President Taylor. Rosenblum had logging and road construction interests in Liberia, and his trucks had been used to carry weapons from Robertsfield to the Sierra Leone border (Ayafor et al, 2000).
The link of trading guns and diamonds between Liberia and Sierra Leone started with the personal relationship between Liberian President Charles Taylor and RUF chairman Foday Sankoh. But Taylor did not get personally involved with helping his friend Sankoh. Instead, he looked the other way, while his closest advisors and friends established the logistical connections within the smuggling business. This provided Taylor with the best of both worlds--denying that, as head of the Liberian government, the country is not involved in aiding RUF, while at the same time providing an environment where his close friends could profit in providing military aid to Sankoh and RUF. It is estimated that Liberian President Charles Taylor had made “more than $400 million per year from the war in the years between 1992 and 1996,” (Berdal and Malone, pg. 5). While most of this $400 million may not have been made specifically through diamond smuggling with Sierra Leone, it does show that Charles Taylor may have used Liberia to benefit in his own economic self-interest. And diamond smuggling was certainly within Charles Taylor’s economic self-interest.
One interesting link that had been uncovered was the possibility that Charles Taylor may have hosted Al-Qaida operatives in his country for the purpose of allowing Al-Qaida to sell diamonds for weapons. Farah reported that Charles Taylor received a $1 million payment for hosting Al-Qaida operatives in his country for at least two months after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, (Farah, 2002). A year long European investigation of Al-Qaida’s financing had uncovered three individuals who may have been conduits to Al-Qaida: Aziz Nassour, a Lebanese diamond merchant, his cousin Samih Osailly, and a Senegalese mercenary Ibrahim Bah, who has also trafficked in guns and diamonds (Farah, 2002). Belgian investigators reported that a small diamond importing company, believed to be owned by Osailly, enjoyed a sudden surge of business and turned over $1 billion a year before Sept. 11, (Farah, 2002). Belgian investigators also noted that $20 million was withdrawn from an ASA Diam account at Artesia bank, which may have been used in purchasing diamonds (Farah, 2002). Investigators believed that Al-Qaida was moving its assets out of the banking system and into commodities. European and U.S. officials had also found evidence that Nassour and Osailly were trying to buy surface-to-air missiles from the Nicaraguan army and a Bulgarian company, (Farah, 2002). Farah reported that Al-Qaida operatives “moved between a protected area in Liberia and the presidential compound in neighboring Burkina Faso,” (2002). Charles Taylor and Burkina Faso President Blaise Campaore both denied the charges, (Farah, 2002).
So why are diamonds so attractive for smuggling? Both Fowler and Goreux noted that diamond’s small size, high value and ease of transport made them attractive to smuggle. The artisanal mining process of alluvial diamonds by UNITA and RUF provided a cheap, easy and steady supply of resources, so as long as the rebels could maintain control of the territory that contained the alluvial deposits. Once government forces took control of the deposits away from UNITA and RUF, the financing for their military operations was also removed. So it was in UNITA’s and RUF’s economic self-interest to exploit the diamonds for as long as they can since they would reap all the benefits in selling the diamonds, while they bore almost no costs associated with the smuggling of diamonds. Michael Ross reported a strong association between civil wars and diamonds—specifically alluvial diamonds (2005). He cited a number of factors to base this association. First is the resources ‘lootability,’ or ease at which the resource can be extracted and transported by individuals or small teams. Conflict diamonds are easily extracted by rebel organizations. Oil, gas, and kimberlite diamonds are not lootable. A resource is ‘obstructable’ if its transportation can be easily blocked by small numbers of individuals or groups with few weapons. Ross said that resources with a high value-to-weight ratio, such as diamonds, can be transported by air and thus are difficult to obstruct. Whereas, resources with a low value-to-weight ratio--such as oil--are easily obstructable (Ross, 2005). Ross also stated that the more lootable a resource is, the more likely the resource will benefit a rebel group. The more unlootable a resource is, the more likely it will benefit the government (2005). He finds it especially notable that Angola has both lootable and unlootable resources, where the government has continuously controlled the unlootable resources of oil while the rebels have gained some control of the lootable resources of diamonds (Ross, 2005). Michael Ross also noted that the more lootable the resource is, the more likely it is to prolong the conflict. He claimed that when the lootable resources flows to the rebels, they are more likely to prolong a conflict since the rebels are typically the weaker party. Without the funding from lootable resources, the rebels would be forced to negotiate a settlement, or be extinguished (Ross, 2005). In the Angolan conflict with UNITA, the civil war at first became a superpower conflict where the government was supported by the Soviet Union, and UNITA was supported by the United States. After the Cold War winded down, the superpower conflict was diminished—as was UNITA’s funding. Conflict diamonds provided a new means to the support for UNITAs operations at the end of the Cold War.
But the issue of conflict diamonds requires more than just the supply of diamonds. It also requires a market demand for those diamonds. As Cook had stated, $7.885 billion of rough diamonds were produced in 2001 (2003). In 2000, a total of $9 billion of rough diamonds had come to the global market, which $5.67 billion were sold by De Beers (Cook, 2003). Goreux reported that in 1999, a total of $7.3 million in rough diamonds were purchased globally, which translated into a worldwide consumption of $56 billion in diamond jewelry (2001). Goreux continues by estimating that 41 percent of the world diamond production valued at the mines, originates from Botswana, South Africa, and Namibia, of which De Beers plays the dominant force (2001). A further 33% of diamond production comes from Russia, Australia, and Canada (Goreux, 2001). These six countries constituted 74 percent of world production (Goreux, 2001). Much of the mining done in these countries utilizes the kimberlitic process (Goreux, 2001). The remaining 26% of world production comes from ten countries in western and central Africa, and a few countries in Asia and Latin America (Goreux). It is these countries that utilize the alluvial mining process (Goreux, 2001). The sheer size and volume of the world diamond market provides an incredible incentive for those individuals and organizations to exploit whatever diamond mining they can in conflicted regions. A second problem with the diamond market is the failure of industry self-regulation. A diamond expert can generally examine a particular stone, and identify its country of origin. The problem arises where diamonds from different geographic regions are mixed together, and then imported into Belgium, classified as mixed goods. This renders the identification of diamonds impossible, since a particular parcel may contain stones from Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, or even Liberia (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification, and Control of Diamonds, 2000). Even more confusing is an example where some Russian stones are exported to Liberia, and then classified as Liberian diamonds when sent to Belgium. This is done to avoid a 0.3 percent import tax on Russian diamonds when entering Belgium (Goreux, 2001). Diamonds mixed from various countries have a greater chance of containing conflict diamonds. Diamonds that are extracted specifically from De Beers’s mines, Canada, Russia, or Australia have not had this problem of mixing with conflict diamonds (Goreux, 2001). Another problem is simply the number of people employed in the diamond industry worldwide. In Belgium, there are over 1,500 companies employing approximately 60 De Beers’s sightholders (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification, and Control of Diamonds, 2000). In 1998, the total workforce in Belgium was estimated to be at 3,000 (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, 2001). Israel employs around 2,000-4,000 in the diamond industry, exporting more than $4.2 billion to the United States. This equates to approximately 46.5% of U.S. import market (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, 2000). Thailand employs nearly 5,000 in the diamond industry, with three De Beers’s sightholders, and is ranked as the world’s ninth largest diamond exporter (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, 2000). The United States employs 1,800 licensed dealers with 25 De Beers’s sightholders, with 100 manufacturers employing about 600 cutters (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, 2000). Finally, India dominates the polished diamond market with exports worth $6 billion and about 50% by value of the world market share of polished diamonds. Indian diamond industry provides 700,000 jobs—with 95% of all employed in cutting diamonds working in India (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification and Control of Diamonds, 2000). With this large number of people employed in multiple countries, and each country developing its own trade, import and export regulations, it becomes almost impossible for the industry to track the source of conflict diamonds—especially if the conflict diamonds are mixed together with other stones in Africa. Because of the extensive trading in diamonds by UNITA and RUF, the United Nations imposed sanctions on diamond trading with UNITA in 1998, then later expanded the sanctions to Liberia and RUF-controlled territories in Sierra Leone (Soggot, 2002).
In 2002, South Africa launched the Kimberly Process. This process was to provide an international framework, which would identify and record the origin of the world’s diamonds under the supervision of the diamond industry’s World Diamond Council (Soggot, 2002). In effect, the diamond industry would police itself in trafficking conflict diamonds by issuing certificates of origin to parcels, which would identified where the stones came from. Yet Goreux reported that in Angola, “a certificate of origin could be bought for five dollars and that UNITA soldiers routinely traded stones with government soldiers. A parcel purchased from the Ministry of Mines could, therefore, be contaminated with conflict diamonds,” (2001). Another flaw of the Kimberly Process was that different nations would have different regulations concerning the importation and exportation of diamonds. In Belgium, customs officials and diamond experts open and inspect each parcel of diamonds entering or leaving Belgium under the supervision of an officer of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. However in India, diamonds are imported, duty-free and no certificates of origin are required (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for Identification, Certification, and Control of Diamonds, 2000). Israel requires that standard documentation should accompany imports of diamonds, with the exception of Angola where a certificate of origin is required. All imported diamond shipments into Israel are also opened and inspected by diamond evaluators. Yet in the United States, imported diamonds are free of duty, and no special documentation or procedures are required. Diamond imports into the United States are regulated according to basic Customs procedures (Conflict Diamonds: Possibilities for the Identification, Certification, and Control of Diamonds, 2000). Soggot reported that the General Accounting Office criticized the Kimberly Process as being ‘inherently flawed,” (2002). The GAO said that, “The period after rough diamonds enter the first foreign port until the final point of sale is covered by a system of voluntary industry participation and self-regulated monitoring and enforcement,” (Soggot, 2002). With certificates being forged, and countries developing their own import/export regulations on diamonds, problems where conflict diamonds can easily enter the market will still continue to haunt the Kimberly Process.
The civil wars in Angola, Sierra Leone, and Liberia have quickly winded down to an end. On February 22, 2002, government forces killed UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi in a firefight in Angola (An End to Angola’s 27 Years of War, 2002). Savimbi’s death had taken the fight out of UNITA. By March 31, both the Angolan government and UNITA had signed a cease-fire agreement to halt the civil war. By November, 2002, both sides had developed agreements to convert UNITA into a political opposition party in Angolan politics, and to promote reconciliation and reconstruction of the country (Former Angolan Rebel Group Offers to Back Government, 2002). The Angolan civil war has killed an estimated 500,000 people, and has displaced millions of Angolans (An End to Angola’s 27 Years of War, 2002). In Sierra Leone, President Kabbah, who was elected in 1996 and then deposed by a military junta, was reinstated to his post after the intervention of Nigerian ECOMOG forces in 1998 (Polity IV Country Report: Sierra Leone, 2005). In 1999, the United Nations sent 12,000 peacekeepers to the country. Near the end of 2000, RUF had disintegrated after the capture of Foday Sankoh (Polity IV Country Report 2003: Sierra Leone, 2005). The combination of increasing government military successes against the rebels and the UN peacekeeping forces had forced disarmament of RUF-controlled regions. By the end of 2001, much of Sierra Leone was under government control (Polity IV Country Report 2003: Sierra Leone). Foday Sankoh died in prison of natural causes on July 29, 2003 (Foday Sankoh, Sierra Leone Rebel Leader, Dies. 2003). In Liberia, ever since Charles Taylor gained power from his own civil war in 1997, two major opposition groups had been attempting to oust Taylor from power. These two opposition groups were the Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), (Liberia – Second Civil War – 1997-2003, 2000-2005). LURD and MODEL had controlled from 60-80 percent of the country when they initiated the war against Taylor (Liberia – Second Civil War – 1997-2003, 2000-2005). The situation in Liberia deteriorated until from February 8 to September 14, 2002, Taylor imposed a state of emergency on the country. After continuing to deny Liberia’s involvement in Sierra Leone, Taylor finally admitted that his government had aided and supported RUF in their civil war in Sierra Leone on November 12, 2002, (Gongloe, 2002). By June 2003, LURD and MODEL forces had cut off Liberia’s capital Monrovia. The United Nations indicted Taylor for war crimes and issued an international warrant for his arrest on June 4, 2003. On July 6, 2003, President Charles Taylor stepped down from office and accepted asylum to Nigeria (Gongloe, 2002). In 2002, the United Nations lifted the ban on selling diamonds in Angola (Angola’s Former Rebels Glad to See UN Sanctions Lifted, 2002).
While the civil wars have ended, the smuggling of conflict diamonds still exists. The networking organizations, the knowledge and contacts still remain. UNITA and RUF leaders have transferred their positions of power in a rebel organization to positions of power as political party members, or positions in government. Instead of smuggling diamonds for weapons, former rebel leaders can smuggle diamonds to enrich themselves or to use diamonds to buy friendships and contacts within the government. Within the alluvial mines, the artisan mining process still exists in Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo where people work for sub-standard wages. The guy with the gun still gets the diamonds. The governments of Angola or DRC must utilize better trained, equipped and better paid soldiers to maintain control of the alluvial mines and stop any forms of corruption. If the governments cannot control the mines, then they must develop a business relationship with the large mining companies to mine the alluvial diamonds. The mining companies have the knowledge, resources, and the economies of scale to secure, control and extract the diamonds in an efficient manner. They can readily hire the artisan miners to mine the diamonds for wages, and perhaps even for a percentage of profit from the diamonds they extract. And the government can also receive a steady income from the diamonds mined from taxes—the current artisan mining does not allow the government to collect revenue from taxation of the miners. In Sierra Leone, the feudalistic process still remains, maintaining power of the mining process with the tribal chiefs, who control the land, and the dealers, who control the supplies. Mining companies contracted to mine the deposits would neutralize the power of the dealers and chiefs, mining the diamonds in an efficient manner while paying the miners wages for their labors. This would also eliminate the continued accumulation of debt of the artisan miners to the dealers, while wages would allow the artisan miners to pay down their debts. If market pricing and knowledge could be brought efficiently into the African countries, then any diamonds the artisan miners could gain from their own labors would be sold to the best possible prices that the artisan miners could seek out, rather than simply giving all the diamonds to the dealers to sell on their behalf. Another problem is that the borders between the African countries are still porous, allowing for the ease of transferring diamonds between countries, and moving the diamonds out to the world market. Even the Kimberly process of controlling conflict diamonds is flawed. Industry self-regulation allows those who operate outside of the industry to profit with impunity. There are no sanctions, or intra-government enforcement in regulating the trade of diamonds or punishing individuals, companies or governments who break the international laws with impunity. Diamond traders in Africa can still mix conflict stones with other stones from South Africa or Botswana, and then sell them to the Indian market where no certificates are required. With today’s advances in desktop publishing and printing, certificates can still easily be forged, allowing the diamonds to move to the different trading centers. Allowing mining companies to mine the alluvial diamonds would provide the control of transferring the diamonds to the market in a legal manner. The diamond industry must also work with governments, law enforcement agencies, and possibly the United Nations to address the flaws of the Kimberly process and develop new regulations to reduce the amount of smuggling, or to channel the smuggling efforts to an improved legal market specifically designed for the conflict diamonds, where traders who wish to specifically buy conflict diamonds may choose to do so in this market. Another alternative may be to scrap the Kimberly process and allow the entire market to decide whether to buy and sell conflict diamonds according to the demands of the market.
For almost 30 years, the civil wars have raged through the African nations, killing and displacing millions of people. The Cold War processes of the United States aiding one faction, and the Soviet Union aiding the other funded much of these wars. It was at the end of the Cold War, where the power and wealth of diamonds became available as the means for financing these wars by rebel organizations. Yet the story of the conflict diamonds simply doesn’t end there. For conflict diamonds also tells the stories of who the leaders were both in the rebel organizations of UNITA’s Jonas Savimbi, and RUF’s Foday Sankoh, and of the governments of Liberia’s Charles Taylor, Togo’s Eyadema, and Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Campaore. It was the personal relationships between these leaders and conflict diamonds were the glue to hold these relationships together. It is ironic that once Savimbi, Sankoh, and Taylor were removed from their positions of power within their organizations that the civil wars and conflict diamonds have died out. Yet positions of power in governments still remain in Africa. Diamonds are still mined in the alluvial plains. It is only a matter of time when the glitter of diamonds wealth and power will cement new relationships with Africa’s new leaders. Hopefully the cement of these new relationships will not be stained red with the “blood diamonds” of conflict.
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