My Thoughts and Comments on The Repubblica Story

I've had a chance now to really go through and read the English translation of the Repubblica expose on the Italian forged documents and their link to the Bush White House. It is amazing. I've included the link for the Nur-al-Cubicle blogsite which I used to read this article. Here are my comments on the story:

This is totally amazing. I’m going to start this post as a series of thoughts and observations regarding La Repubblica’s expose. Quotes from the article are italicized.

Let’s start with Rocco Martino, the ‘postman,’ in this debacle. He has a background in military intelligence and worked for SISMI until 1999 as a double agent. He was also working for French intelligence, selling information on Italian intelligence to the French and French intelligence to the Italians. Rocco Martino was playing both sides off each other.

Martino finds out that the French are interested in discovering who is mining and smuggling uranium from Niger at around 1999 to 2000. So Martino hatches a plan with his friend Antonio Nucera, who works at the SISMI divisions that investigate WMD in Africa and the Middle East.

An unnamed Italian intelligence official claims that Nucera’s division got a hold of a Niger code book and a “telex from Ambassador Adamou Chékou to the Niger Foreign Ministry informing Niamey that Wissam al-Zahawie, the Iraqi Ambassador to the Vatican, would be coming to Niger as a representative of Saddam Hussein.

But that wasn’t all. We confiscated maraging steel (ultra-high strength steel) in the port of Trieste. We thought it was destined for a series of centrifuges used to separate uranium. We exchanged information on Iraqi nuclear proliferation at the end of the eighties with the British of MI6—the cream of the crop. A sincere friend of Italy worked there: Hamilton MacMillan. MacMillan mentored Francesco Cossiga [Interior Minister, in charge during the kidnapping and murdering of Aldo Moro by the Red Brigades] in Cossiga's introduction to the mysterious ways of espionage when he was "resident" in Rome.”

So Hamilton MacMillan is an intelligence official at MI6, who worked with the Italian intelligence.

Martino asked for information from Nucera regarding uranium purchases from Africa that he could sell to the French. Nucera gives this telex from the Niger ambassador regarding al Zahawie’s trip. Nucera also provides Martino with an intelligence contractor, La Signora, who works at the Niger embassy in Rome. La Signora introduces Martino and Nucera to another contact at the Niger embassy, First Embassy Counselor Zakaria Yaou Maiga. It seems that everyone here—Martino, La Signora, Maiga, and possibly Nucera needed money. So on New Year’s Eve of 2001, they simulate a break-in of the Niger embassy and steal the Niger embassy letterhead and official stamps.

‘ Old documents are extracted from the SISMI division’s archives where Nucera is deputy chief of section: code books, letters, contracts and a memorandum of understanding between the government of Niger and Iraq “concerning the supply of uranium on 5 and 6 July 2000 in Niamey”. The memorandum has a 2-page attachment entitled “Agreement.”’ The forgeries are created using old SISMI intelligence and combining it with new stuff created with the Niger embassy stationary. Martino sells the stuff to French intelligence.
“The French take the documents and toss them in the dumpster. One of the agents remarks, Niger is a French-speaking place and we know how things are there. But nobody would have confused one minister with another they way they did in that useless piece of garbage.”

September 11 comes up. President Bush wants intelligence proof that Saddam is building WMDs to build his case for Iraq. Nicolo Pollari now runs SISMI. Prime Minister Berlusconi wants Pollari to give him information that would provide Italy lots of international brownie points from the the U.S. President Bush is looking for proof to use against Saddam. The White House and Cheney are pressuring the CIA to provide that proof. “The absence of proof isn’t proof of absence, philosophizes Rumsfeld at the Pentagon. In that kind of climate, with their phony dossier, the snake oil salesmen of via Baiamonti, (Rocco Martino and Antonio Nucera) would be useful. So what do they do in the fall of 2001? Rocco Martino describes it this way: At the end of 2001, SISMI handed the yellowcake dossier to the British of MI6”.

Did SISMI hand these forged documents to their MI6 ally Hamilton MacMillan?

“They hand over a dossier devoid of scrutiny. They claim only that they got it from “a reliable source.” Then they make a small tweak: SISMI wanted to disseminate the Niger documents to allied intelligence but at the same time, did not want its collaboration in the operation known.” SISMI didn’t want British intelligence to know that these documents were forged by SISMI operatives using old archival material.

Pollari vouches for the information in these forged documents to CIA station chief Jeff Castelli. The documents end up at the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence—the Office of Strategic, Military and WMD Proliferation Affairs. So by 2001, these forged documents are in U.S. intelligence hands.

Now here’s an interesting part of the story: “Strategic Affairs is not a big place. At the time, 16 analysts worked there under the direction of Greg Thielmann. Thielmann tells La Repubblica: I received the report in fall of 2001. We thought that Langley acquired it from their field officer in Italy. The agent in the field reports that Italian intelligence permitted him see some papers documenting the attempt by Iraq to acquire 500 tons of uranium ore from Niger. So, SISMI purported the truth of documents it knew to be false to the CIA. There’s a second confirmation. At Langley, Ambassador Joseph C. Wilson was assigned the mission to verify the Italian “story” of the 500 tons of uranium.” SISMI tells that these documents are true to the CIA, even though they knew them to be falsified? Now Joe Wilson enters the story to check out these Italian claims.

The CIA rejects the bogus documents. ‘CIA analysts consider the report to be “somewhat limited” and “lacking in necessary detail”. Intelligence and Research analysts at the US Department of State qualify the intelligence as “highly suspect.”’

Now this gets interesting: Pollari, “who is no fool, surveys the landscape and the players of the ongoing behind-the-scenes battle in the American Administration between those who stress caution and pragmatism (the US Department of State and the CIA) and those who are looking for an excuse to start a war (Cheney and the Pentagon), which is already on the drawing board. However, when the SISMI director returns to Italy, he perceives a similar battle underway in Rome. Gianni Castellaneta advises Pollari to look in other directions, while Defense Minister Antonio Martino tell Pollari to expect a visit from an old friend of Italy.” We have hawks and doves in both Washington and Rome—both with different agendas, and yet they complement each other. The hawks of Washington—Cheney, Rumsfeld—want any excuse to start a war, while the doves of Powell, and the CIA stress caution. In Rome, Pollari is told by Castellaneta to stress caution (look in other directions), while Defense Minister Antonio Martino is pushing Pollari to see Michael Ledeen. Ledeen is working for the Office of Special Plans, headed by Paul Wolfowitz to collect information in support for the Iraq war. Pollari talks to Ledeen about the forged documents. Ledeen takes the information to Wolfowitz, who takes it to Cheney. Cheney then pressures the CIA to look into this intelligence, even though the CIA already knows these documents are bogus.

Now here’s another interesting piece of information. Pollari marginalized his own SISMI station chief in Washington—an Admiral Giuseppe Grignolo. Apparently Grignolo had an excellent relationship with the CIA and possessed extensive background on WMDs. There’s a good chance that Grignolo would have quickly seen these Italian documents as fakes. So Pollari blocks Grignolo and instead works through the NSA or the Office of Special Plans.

“On September 9, 2002, General Nicolò Pollari met with Stephen Hadley, deputy to National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice.”

Now we bring in the Panorama affair. Rocco Martino attempts to sell the forged documents to Panorama’s editor Carlo Rossella. Panoram publishes the Sept. 12-19, 2002 scoop “War with Iraq? It has already begun.” Martino also has given the documents to MI6, and contacts Panorama reporter Elisabetta Burba to sell her the documents. Burba checks up on the documents and discovers they are bogus. Unfortunately, Rossella loves the idea of Martino giving him ‘the smoking gun,’ and sends the documents back to the U.S. Embassy in Rome, where CIA station chief Castelli already knows they’re fakes. These forged Italian documents have gone through three different channels. The first was through the normal CIA intelligence channels, of which the CIA rejected them. The second channel was through Ledeen and the Office of Special Planning, where they went up through Wolfowitz and to Cheney. The third channel was through the Italian press, where Panorama’s editor Rossella sends them back to the U.S. Embassy in Rome—where they were first judged as bogus.

Now back to Pollari’s meeting with Hadley on September 9, 2002. “Pollari knows everything. He has been apprised of sordid adventure of Rocco Martino. His own men were up to their necks in it. He is familiar with the role played by SISMI deputy chief Antonio Nucera, who lends a hand to snake oil salesman Martino. On this day, Pollari is facing a choice for which he has all the elements: to tell Rice’s deputy that the White House had better forget about the uranium story, because it’s a hoax and that the Martino-Nucera duo are imposters, or to reinforce the convictions of the American ally through a little shrewd silence. So what does Pollari choose to do?

Some background first. On September 8, 2002, New York Times Judith Miller reports on a story where Iraq was attempting to purchase aluminum tubes which could be used as rotor sheathing for centrifuges to enrich uranium. In reality, these were not tubes to be used in centrifuges to enrich uranium, but rather the tubes were used for making artillery shells. These tubes could specifically be used to make 81-mm rocket artillery shells in the Medusa air-to-ground missile system, used by the Italian Army. The Iraqis were familiar with this type of weapon system since they purchased this system from the Italians during their military cooperation with Italy in the 1980s.

On September 9, 2002, seated in front of Stephen Hadley, Pollari has the means to address even this aspect of the issue. SISMI claims that it has documentary proof of the acquisition of aluminum tubes by Iraq. Pollari knew that this intelligence the Miller wrote was also bogus. But Pollari did not say a word about the aluminum tubes, or about the forged document regarding Iraqi purchases of uranium from Niger. Pollari kept his mouth shut. He basically went along with the entire scheme.

Pollari does not have Rocco Martino “busted” when he knocks on the door of MI6. Instead, Pollari credits Martino as “a reliable source”. He does not put the damper on the enthusiasm of Michel Ledeen and the Pentagon’s Office of Special Plans. He simply sits there in silence as the imbroglio simmers. In fact, when he does open his mouth, he neither extinguishes nor disappoints American hopes. This is what happened in the case of the aluminum tubes. Following a “brilliant operation”, SISMI enters into material possession of the tubes. It’s a military intelligence victory.

On September 12, Panorama publishes its article “War with Iraq? It has already started.” On September 24, British Prime Minister Tony Blair announces that the Iraqi purchases of uranium yellowcake from Africa. Finally President Bush announces the proof of Iraq purchasing uranium from Africa in his 2003 State of the Union address.

If this entire Repubblica article is even half true, it is almost amazing how a simple third-rate attempt at forging old documents for money, could have ended up to the highest reaches of power in Washington, Rome, and London. The information portrayed in these forgeries were almost too good to be true for everyone involved. The Bush White House wanted to believe these documents as definitive proof for going to war in Iraq. The Italian government of Prime Minister Berlusconi wanted to use these documents to curry favors with the Bush White House—even though SISMI’s Pollari knew that these documents were fakes. Tony Blair used the documents to rally British support for the war. And yet no-one questioned the validity of these documents. And those who did look closely at them—the CIA in Rome, Elisabetta Burba with Panorama Magazine, even the French intelligence with whom these forgeries were originally designed for—their objections were ignored, or discredited as Ambassador Joe Wilson would learn when his wife Valerie Plame would be exposed as working for the CIA. This is not a conspiracy of top government officials in the U.S., Italy, or Great Britain, to use these documents for their own self-interests. But rather, this is a conspiracy of incompetence and hubris between the three governments and their self-interested officials. And as their incompetence regarding these forged documents becomes publicly known, it is only natural for these top leaders to cover up their own failures due to their hubris and incompetence.